PDT is a good idea. I propose a compensation rate of 100%. Victims are reimbursed for losses, rather than being given the opportunity to earn money.
Next, create a PDT-USDT liquidity pool and use all funds for compensation to purchase PDT at the market price until the price reaches 1. This way, impatient victims will be able to get out faster and the amount for a refund will be significantly reduced.
The compensation period is not determined. I propose an initial allocation of 30% of all revenues. This will be enough to start with. In the future, it will be possible to revise the share.
Also, payments should not affect other subdao in any way. We are in DEFI. And people need to understand all the high risks. I myself was a victim of hacker attacks on the other protocol. They returned only 50 percent. And now this protocol is working fine. He has not lost any trust. MAGPIE will also continue to exist. The main thing is to repay the debt gradually and little by little, without causing any damage to others SUBDAO.
also, does anyone know what is going on with the rewards of the pools that have been frozen ? are they still earning anything or not; because maybe we can share a % of those revenue (if they are accruing in the backend but not reflected on the frontend) to help compensate a bit of the lost funds. It could be a little help on top of bigger plans decided by smarter people than me. Personally i don’t have a lot in those frozen pools (around 20K$ on Mainnet and Arbitrum), but if giving away a % of the rewards can help.
Penpie Recovery Plan
This is the recovery plan I drafted based on discussions and ideas from the TG Chinese community. The docs link:
It is quite lengthy, so here is the TL;DR version:
1. What Happens to LP (Liquidity Providers)
- Compensation through SAFUPIE: LPs who suffered asset losses in the hack will receive compensation in the form of credits (SFC). These credits can be used to receive SFP tokens or be sold on the market.
- Claim Process: LPs can apply for compensation from the compensation treasury, with the amount calculated based on the ratio of treasury funds to remaining debt. For example, if the treasury holds 10% of the remaining debt, a claim for $10,000 in credits will yield $1,000 in tokens.
- Ongoing Revenue Allocation: A portion of the ongoing revenue from participating SubDAOs will be allocated to replenish the compensation treasury, ensuring continuous support for LP claims.
2. What Happens to PNP and mPendle
- Restructuring for Profitability: The plan emphasizes restructuring Penpie's revenue model to focus on profitability rather than maintaining the mPendle peg and PNP token price. The goal is to minimize the impact of the exploit by optimizing vePendle revenue utilization.
- Shift in Revenue Allocation and vePendle Growth: A significant focus will be on increasing the protocol’s vePendle holdings, which will enhance its voting power and profitability. This increase in vePendle will directly benefit PNP holders by boosting the intrinsic value of mPendle, leading to higher rewards and long-term growth potential for the protocol.
- Debt Transfer: Since Penpie has transferred its debt to SAFUPIE, it is automatically enrolled in the insurance plan, and 10% of its revenue will be used to fulfill compensation obligations.
3. What Happens to MGP or vlMGP
- Change in Reward Structure: The reward structure for vlMGP will change, replacing some rewards with SFP tokens instead of PNP. After the debt transfer, Penpie's revenue will no longer contribute to vlMGP rewards.
- SFP as Compensation: Magpie's contributions to the SFP compensation fund will earn credits that can be converted into SFP tokens, which will then be distributed to vlMGP holders.
- Long-Term Incentives: As all tokens circulate and debts are managed, any additional revenue generated will continue to fund vlMGP rewards indirectly, through SFP and ongoing growth of protocol revenue.
Recovery Plan Details - English
1.0 Creation of SAFUPIE:This proposal suggests that the Magpie team create a new entity, SAFUPIE. The role of this SubDAO will be similar to that of an insurance fund, with its primary goal being to accumulate revenue most of the time. In the event of an emergency, such as a hacking incident like the recent one, the SubDAO will use its funds to help repay its debts or transfer those debts.
SAFUPIE Mechanism and IDO Token Issuance:
-
Token Name: SFP
Total Token Supply: 10 million
Token Issuance Method: Burn SFC credits, deposit funds into the operational/compensation treasury.
The debt amount is $30 million; for every $3 of debt eliminated or capital deposited, 1 SFP will be issued. -
Credit Name: SFC (Safu Credits)
Total Credit Issuance: $30 million in credits (approximately $27 million in Penpie debt transfer + less than $3 million for operational and audit costs)
Credit Issuance Method:- Around $27 million will be airdropped to users based on the losses from the hacking incident.
- The remaining credits will be airdropped to SAFUPIE for operational use, establishing initial credit liquidity.
- Further details will be explained later.
-
In the future, 5% of the IDO funds from SubDAOs will be automatically allocated to participate in the insurance plan provided by SFP, and a continuous contribution of 3% (tentative) of protocol revenue will be required.
-
Existing SubDAOs (excluding Penpie) will decide through community voting whether to participate in this insurance plan. If they choose to participate, they must also begin and continue contributing 3% of their protocol revenue.
-
As for Penpie, since it has already transferred its debts to SAFUPIE and is the SubDAO that initiated this insurance plan, a different approach is needed. Further details will be provided in the following sections.
-
Any legal entity, organization, or individual may voluntarily participate in the credit sale.
-
Credit holders can, at any time:
- Burn the held credits and receive a proportional amount of SFP tokens accordingly. Participating SubDAOs can choose to use these tokens for governance purposes.
- Sell the credits on the liquidity market.
- Apply for compensation from the compensation treasury. The compensation will be calculated based on the ratio of the treasury’s funds to the remaining debt (excluding governance credits).
For example, if the compensation treasury holds tokens valued at $2.7 million and the remaining credit amount is $27 million:
$2.7 million / $27 million = 0.1
When a user applies for compensation of $10,000 in credits, they will receive compensation in tokens valued at $10,000 x 0.1 = $1,000.
At the same time, $10,000 worth of credits will be burned, leaving the treasury with tokens valued at $2,699,000 and 26.99 million credits remaining.
- Only SubDAOs that participate in the SFP insurance plan are eligible for debt transfer, provided that the debt transfer proposal is approved through SFP governance voting.
SFP Tokenomics:
- Initial liquidity will be provided by the Penpie or Magpie treasury to create a pool on PancakeSwap and launch Cakepie. The Magpie team will allocate 2 million $MGP from the Magpie team allocation to be periodically deposited into Cakepie to provide bribes for the pool, ensuring continuous acquisition of $Cake emissions. As long as the bribing efficiency remains above 1.0, the deposited funds will be maximized for profitability. The pool can also benefit from veCake’s boosted rewards, with a focus on maximizing pool returns.
- 3% of the assets contributed by each DAO will be allocated as follows: 70% to the compensation treasury and 30% to the governance/operational treasury.
- Approximately $27 million worth of credits can be compensated through the compensation treasury based on the ratio of the treasury’s value to the remaining debt (excluding governance credits). The remaining governance credits, totaling less than $3 million, can only be withdrawn from the governance treasury on a 1:1 basis to fund project operations.
- For every $3 contributed to the treasury by a participating SubDAO, or for every $3 in credits burned, 1 SFP token will be issued. The SubDAO community can decide whether to airdrop the acquired tokens to users or lock them up to gain governance power and rewards.
- SFP governance rights will determine whether a protocol is eligible for the opportunity of SFP debt transfer.
- If all tokens are in circulation and no new debt arises, any revenue generated will continue to be added to the compensation fund proportionally.
- If all tokens are in circulation and new debt arises, no new SFP tokens will be minted; instead, new credits will be issued and directly airdropped to the affected parties.
SFP Compensation Fund:
- 70% of the revenue contributed by each SubDAO will be allocated to the compensation fund, while 30% will be allocated to the operational fund.
- The operational treasury’s funds will primarily be used to establish liquidity, support operations, and provide staking rewards for the SFP lock-up pool (vlSFP).
- The maximum amount available for operational use is approximately $3 million (reflecting the initial issuance of less than $3 million in credits).
- Without affecting operations, the majority of the operational treasury will be allocated to the lock-up pool as staking rewards.
- In the compensation fund, 50% (adjustable) of the funds will be used for staking (e.g., Pendle/BTC) to generate returns, while the other 50% (adjustable) will be kept in the compensation treasury to handle potential claims.
- The compensation treasury will primarily hold assets such as BTC, ETH, and USD, as mainstream assets provide more secured value compared to altcoins (representing about 70% of the project’s holdings).
- The operational treasury, on the other hand, will mainly hold altcoins to generate sufficient returns for SFP and sustain the project’s operations (representing about 30% of the project’s holdings).
- Once the $27 million in credits is fully resolved, the compensation fund will merge with the operational treasury, and the principal will continue to accumulate. At that point, vlSFP will be entitled to receive 100% of the project’s interest income.
- If a new compensation event occurs, 70% of the mainstream assets will be reallocated to reestablish the compensation fund to address the new debt issues.
Credit Liquidity Pool:
- At the initial stage of the project, 250,000 credits from the initial issuance will be allocated, along with 125,000 USDT/USDC provided by the Magpie/Penpie treasury, to establish a credit pool with a 1:0.5 USD, such as an SFC-USDT pool.
Compensation Method:
- Credit holders can at any time:
- Burn the credits they hold to receive a proportional amount of SFP tokens. Participating SubDAOs can choose to use these tokens for governance purposes.
- Sell the credits on the liquidity market.
- Apply for compensation from the compensation treasury, which will be provided based on the ratio of the treasury’s funds to the remaining debt (excluding governance credits).
For example: If the compensation treasury holds tokens valued at $2.7 million and the remaining credits amount to $27 million:
$2.7 million / $27 million = 0.1
When a user applies for compensation of $10,000 in credits, they will receive tokens valued at $10,000 x 0.1 = $1,000. At the same time, $10,000 worth of credits will be burned. After this transaction, the treasury will have a remaining value of $2,699,000, and the remaining credit amount will be 26.99 million.
$SFP Utilities:
- The Magpie MegaDAO ecosystem will provide a significant advantage, and effectively utilizing it can offer more use cases for $SFP beyond just staking rewards, helping to stabilize its price.
- One potential utility is to allow vlSFP to become a shared Boost Multiplier in each SubDAO’s Rush activities. Typically, only the SubDAO’s own locked tokens, such as vlPNP, can be used as a Boost Multiplier in Rush activities. We could make vlSFP an alternative Boost Multiplier alongside the SubDAO’s tokens.
- Another utility could be allowing $SFP to be burned for more IDO allocations, similar to $MGP. However, these allocations should not be taken from the $MGP allocation but rather should be a separate, distinct allocation that is smaller than that of $MGP, to avoid causing dissatisfaction among $MGP holders.
2.0 Changes to the vlMGP Reward Structure:
The current vlMGP reward structure consists of $PNP, $RDP, and $CKP. The condition for revenue sharing from a SubDAO should be that the SubDAO’s operations are profitable. After this incident, Penpie’s operations are running at a loss, and with the debt transferred to Safupie, the associated revenue should no longer be shared but instead be redirected to the SFP compensation fund.
Similarly, whenever Magpie deposits this revenue into the SFP compensation fund, it will receive corresponding credits, which can then be burned to obtain $SFP tokens that are distributed to vlMGP holders. This means that the new reward structure will consist of $SFP, $RDP, and $CKP.
3.0 Overall Changes to Penpie:
After the incident, the community’s primary concern is the future direction of Penpie and whether compensation efforts will reduce the direct benefits of mPendle and PNP. The main purpose of establishing Safupie is to minimize the impact of the exploited protocol as much as possible. Although the debt has been transferred, a restructuring of the revenue model is still inevitable.
The focus of the restructuring should be on enhancing profitability, rather than primarily catering to users’ demands for maintaining the mPendle peg and the PNP token price, as was done before.
Note: Since the debt transfer, Penpie has been automatically enrolled in the Safupie insurance plan.
Current Overall Revenue of Penpie
- The entire revenue of the Penpie protocol is determined by the vePendle controlled by the protocol, and the vePendle revenue consists of the following parts:
- Guide pools to receive Pendle emissions for LP through voting.
- Obtain a 3% base reward to repurchase PNP for bribes.
- Obtain 80% of the swap fees from the voted pools through voting; 50% of these fees are used to buyback mPendle and add to the pool, while the other 50% is used to buyback PNP and distribute it as a voter reward.
- Boost the rewards earned by LPs on the Penpie platform. The Penpie protocol will take a 22% cut from the boosted rewards as a fee. The detailed distribution is shown in the diagram below:
Proposed vePendle Revenue Distribution:
- Based on the records from May to August, the average monthly vePendle revenue over these four months was 179.5 ETH (including base rewards and voter rewards). The majority of this revenue was used for buyback mPendle and PNP; however, these simple buybacks do not generate additional income for the protocol, as the core income driver, vePendle, does not increase through buyback.
- Firstly, let’s list the areas where the revenue can be effectively utilized:
- Directly locked as vePendle without minting new mPendle: This continuously increases the vePendle holdings and profitability, enhances the intrinsic value of mPendle, and continuously boosts the voting power and rewards for vlPNP.
- Deposit into the SFP compensation fund and receive $SFP tokens: This is an obligation as part of the Safupie insurance plan. However, the received $SFP can be used as stake rewards or for bribes in the mPendle LP pool, depending on whether the bribing efficiency is greater than 1.0.
- Purchase and burn credit tokens from the credit liquidity pool to obtain $SFP tokens: This is an obligation for debt transfer. If the credit price is less than 0.95, more credit tokens will be purchased from the pool to obtain more $SFP. Similarly, the acquired $SFP can be used as stake rewards or for bribes in the mPendle LP pool. If the credit price is greater than 0.95, the funds are directly deposited into the SFP compensation fund.
- Serve as a lock-up reward for mPendle SV: The reward is distributed by buyback PNP, tying mPendle’s value to vePendle’s revenue. Therefore, continuously increasing vePendle will also increase the SV pool’s returns over time.
- Distributed as voter rewards to vlPNP: The reward is distributed by buyback PNP. As vePendle continues to increase, vlPNP’s voting power will also grow, thereby indirectly boosting voter rewards.
- Next is the distribution ratio:
- Directly lock as vePendle without minting new mPendle: 50%
- Deposit into the SFP compensation fund and receive $SFP tokens: 3%
- Purchase and burn credit tokens from the credit liquidity pool to obtain $SFP tokens: 7%
- Serve as a lock-up reward for mPendle SV: 15%
- Distributed as voter rewards to vlPNP: 25%
Taking August’s vePendle revenue as an example:
- Voter Revenue: 60 ETH (50% for buyback mPendle, 50% for repurchasing PNP to be distributed as voter rewards)
- Base Revenue: 151 ETH (used for buyback PNP for bribes)
So, the revenue for vlPNP in August (excluding bribes) is actually 60 ETH * 0.5 = 30 ETH.
However, under the new distribution rules, vlPNP will receive (60 + 151) * 0.25 = 52.75 ETH.
Therefore, the new distribution method will not reduce the benefits for vlPNP. Moreover, the new distribution method will continuously increase the protocol’s vePendle holdings each month, thereby enhancing the intrinsic value of mPendle and the voting power of vlPNP, while also steadily increasing vePendle revenue.
Proposed LP Boosted Rewards Distribution:
- Restore the 20% fee as one of the strategies to re-attract LPs after the incident.
- New boosted rewards distribution:
**Penpie 復蘇計劃書**
## 1. 創建SAFUPIE：此計劃書提議由Magpie團隊另外創建SAFUPIE。此SubDAO的作用將類似於保險，多數時間將以纍積收益為第一目標，在SubDAO有需要時（如此次被盜事件），則將把資金用來幫助償還SubDAO的債務，或把債務轉移。
1.1. SAFUPIE機制與IDO代幣發行：
- 代幣名稱：SFP
- 代幣總量：1000萬
- 代幣發行方式：
- 銷毀SFC債權，注資營運/賠償基金。
- 債權3000萬美元，每協助消除/注資3美元的債權將派發1 $SFP
- 債權名稱：SFC （Safu Credits）
- 發行總量：3000萬美元債權
- 約2700萬Penpie債務轉移 + 不到300萬營運和審計費用
- 債權發行方式：
- 2700多萬按駭客事件損失金額空投給用戶。
- 剩餘債權空投給SUFAPIE 用於營運，建立債權初始流動性。詳細細節見 #1.4。
- 發行總量：3000萬美元債權
- 未來SubDAO的IDO資金將有5%（暫定）用作自動參與SFP提供的保險計劃，並持續貢獻3%（暫定）的協議收益。
- 現有的SubDAO（不含Penpie）將由各自的社區投票參不參與此保險計劃。若參與，也必須開始並持續貢獻3%的協議收益。
- Penpie：則由於已將債務轉移至SAFUPIE，也因爲是催生此保險計劃的SubDAO，處理方式不宜相同，將在後面章節給予詳細説明。
- 各法人、機構或個人可以自願參與到債權銷售。
- 債權持有人可在任何時候：
- 銷毀持有的債權，並按照份額獲得相應比例的SFP代幣，參與的SubDAO可選擇將這些代幣用於治理代幣用途。
- 於流動性市場販售債權。
- 向賠償基金申請賠償，按賠償基金/剩餘債務(不包含治理債權)比例獲得賠償。
- 例如: 假設賠償基金擁有價值270萬美元代幣，債權幣剩餘2700萬美元
（270萬/2700萬 = 0.1）。- 當用戶申請1萬美元債權申請賠償：
- 將收到10000X0.1=1000美元價值的代幣賠償。
- 同時銷毀1萬美元的債權，這時基金將剩餘價值為2699000元，債權代幣將剩餘2699萬顆。
- 當用戶申請1萬美元債權申請賠償：
- 例如: 假設賠償基金擁有價值270萬美元代幣，債權幣剩餘2700萬美元
- 只有參與了SFP保險計劃的SubDAO才有獲得債務轉移的資格。前提是債務轉移提案通過SFP治理投票。
1.2. SFP代幣經濟：
- 初始流動性將由Penpie或Magpie國庫提供，于Pancakeswap建立池子並上綫Cakepie。
- Magpie團隊從$MGP團隊份額中提出200萬$MGP，每期注入Cakepie為該池子提供賄賂，用於為池子持續獲取$Cake排放。只要賄賂效益高於1.0，就能把注入的資金最大利益化。該池子還能獲得veCake的boost收益，務必將池子收益最大化。
- 各DAO注資的3%資產，其中70%投入賠償基金，30%投入治理/營運基金。
- 約2700萬的債權能透過賠償基金，按基金價值/剩餘債務(不包含治理債權)比例獲得賠償。
- 剩餘不到300萬的治理債權則僅能按 1:1的比例於治理基金提取資金用於項目營運。
- 參與的SubDAO每貢獻3美元進入基金，或者銷毀3美元的債權即可獲得1 $SFP代幣。
- 所獲得的$SFP代幣，SubDAO社區可自行決定空投給用戶，或鎖倉以獲得治理權力和收益。
- SFP的治理權力將決定參與的協議是否能獲得SFP債務轉移的機會，或其他援助方式。
- 當代幣全部流通並無新債務，所獲得收益繼續以同比例納入賠償基金。
- 當代幣全部流通而出現新債務，SFP代幣不增發，增發債權直接空投給受害者。
1.3. SFP賠償基金：
- 各SubDAO貢獻的收益：70%納入基金、30%納入Safupie項目營運基金。
- 營運基金資金主要用於建立流動性、項目團隊營運和SFP鎖倉池（vlSFP）的質押收益。
- 其中，營運所能使用的上限約為300萬u。(最初發行不到300萬的債權)
- 在不影響營運下，營運基金絕大部分將投入鎖倉池作爲質押收益。
- 賠償基金裏的資金，50%(可調整)用於質押（如Pendle/BTC）獲取收益，50%(可調整)放置於賠償基金應對隨時可以能賠償申請。
- 賠償基金主要持有BTC ETH USD相關資產 ，主流資產相對於山寨幣更有擔保的價值。 (約佔項目70%)
營運基金則主要持有山寨幣 ，以便為SFP創造足夠的收益維持項目運轉。(約佔項目30%) - 當2700萬債權全數解決，賠償基金將與營運基金合併，本金將持續累積，而vlSFP將可開始獲得項目100%的利息收益。直到發生新一輪的賠償事件，則70%的主流資產將重新建立賠償基金，解決新的債務問題。
1.4. 債權流動性池子：
- 項目啓動初期，從最初發行的債權中取出25萬債權，配合Magpie/Penpie國庫提供的12.5萬USDT/USDC，建立初始比例1:0.5美金的債權池子。如SFC-USDT。
1.5. 賠償方式：
- 債權持有人可在任何時候：
- 銷毀持有的債權，並按照份額獲得相應比例的SFP代幣，參與的SubDAO可選擇將這些代幣用於治理代幣用途。
- 於流動性市場販售債權。
- 向賠償基金申請賠償，按賠償基金/剩餘債務(不包含治理債權)比例獲得賠償。
- 例如: 假設賠償基金擁有價值270萬美元代幣，債權幣剩餘2700萬美元
（270萬/2700萬 = 0.1）。- 當用戶申請1萬美元債權申請賠償：
- 將收到10000X0.1=1000美元價值的代幣賠償。
- 同時銷毀1萬美元的債權，這時基金將剩餘價值為2699000元，債權代幣將剩餘2699萬顆。
- 當用戶申請1萬美元債權申請賠償：
- 例如: 假設賠償基金擁有價值270萬美元代幣，債權幣剩餘2700萬美元
1.6. $SFP應用場景：
- Magpie MegaDAO生態將是個優勢，好好利用起來將能為$SFP提供更多除了質押收益外的應用場景，有助穩定價格。
- 其中一個可能的應用是：讓vlSFP成爲每個SubDAO的Rush活動裏，共用的Boost Multiplier。通常來説，只有SubDAO本身的鎖倉代筆，例如vlPNP能用作Rush活動的Boost Multiplier。我們可以讓vlSFP成爲除了SubDAO代幣外的另類Boost Multiplier。
- 還有一種就是，讓$SFP跟$MGP一樣，可以燃燒銷毀以獲得更多IDO份額。當然，該份額不應該取自MGP，而是應該另外獨立的份額，并且應該要少於MGP的份額，不然會引起MGP持有者的反感。
2. vlMGP收益結構的更改：
目前的vlMGP收益結構為$PNP、$RDP和$CKP。SubDAO收益共享的前提條件應該是建立於該SubDAO的營運是有盈利的。此次事件後，Penpie的營運是虧損的，并且在債務轉移給Safupie后，這部分收益自然不該繼續共享，而是同步轉移至SFP賠償基金。
同樣的，每當Magpie把這項收益注入SFP賠償基金，也能獲得相應的債權，并且可以銷毀債權獲得$SFP代幣，然後派發給vlMGP用戶。即是説，新的收益結構將會是$SFP，$RDP和$CKP。
3. Penpie協議 - 收益分配改動提案：
事件發生後，社群最關心的莫過於Penpie今後的路該怎麽走，賠償是否會削減mPendle和PNP的直接利益。而成立Safupie的初衷也在於盡量減少被盜協議的影響。儘管債務轉移了，可是收益結構的重組依然是在所難免。
而重組的方向，應該是致力於提高盈利能力，而非像之前那般重點迎合用戶們對mPendle peg與PNP幣價的要求。
注：從債務轉移起，Penpie就已經默認加入Safupie保險計劃。
3.1. 目前Penpie整體收益：
- 整個Penpie協議的收益由協議控制的vependle決定，而vePendle收益由以下幾部分：
- 透過投票 引導池子獲得pendle排放給LP
- 獲得3%的base reward用來回購PNP用於賄賂
- 透過投票 取得所投票池80%交易費，50%用來回購mpendle加池子 50%用來回購pnp作為voter reward發放
- 提升(Boost) Penpie平台上LP所獲得的獎勵，Penpie協議將收取22% 的boosted reward作為抽成，詳細分配見下圖：
3.2. 提議vePendle收益分配：
3.2.1. 背景：
- 根據5-8月的記錄，Penpie協議通過持有的vePendle平均每月獲得179.5ETH的收益 （base rewards + voter rewards）。
- 當前Penpie的 vePendle 收益分配：
- $mPendle 回購：50%
- $PNP 回購：50%
- 當前 Penpie的 vePendle 回購潛在問題：$PNP & $mPendle的回購雖然提升了Penpie生態的內循環與持有者收益，但沒有為 Penpie 協議帶來更多收入。因爲 Penpie 協議的底層收益能力（vePendle數量）并沒有因爲回購增加。
3.2.2. vePendle收益可投入的選項：
- [新增] 使用 $ETH，購入 $Pendle 並鎖定為 vePendle，增加Penpie協議的vePendle持有量：
- 此過程將不會鑄造新的mPendle。
- 此過程將提高 $mPendle 與 $vlPNP 的內在價值。（每一單位的 $mPendle 與 $vlPNP 對應更多的 $Pendle 與 vePendle）。
- [新增] 使用 $ETH，存入 Safupie 賠償基金並獲得$SFP代幣，實踐參與Safupie保險計畫的義務與支持Penpie事故賠償的執行。
- 後續延伸可行性：Penpie 協議可以在未來將回購取得的$SFP代幣再利用。例如：作為Penpie mPendle LP、mPendle SV、vlPNP質押等池子的獎勵。
- [新增] 使用 $ETH，從債權幣流動性池子購買債權幣銷毀並獲得$SFP代幣：
- 此爲債務轉移的義務。由於債券池子隨市場浮動，此舉能為Penpie協議獲取更多債券以換取更多$SFP。所得$SFP可以視情況用作mPendle LP池子的直接收益或賄賂。
- [新增] 使用 $ETH，回購＄PNP，將$PNP作爲mPendle SV的鎖倉獎勵：
- 提高收益，並將mPendle 與 vePendle的收益關聯。
- [現有] 使用 $ETH，回購＄PNP，將$PNP作爲Voter收益派給vlPNP持有者
備註：vePendle收益初始狀態是$ETH。
3.2.3. 建議的vePendle收益分配比例：
- 直接鎖成vePendle且不鑄造新的mPendle：50%
- 存進SFP賠償基金並獲得$SFP代幣：3%
- 從債權幣流動性池子購買債權幣銷毀並獲得$SFP代幣：7%
- 作爲mPendle SV的鎖倉獎勵：15%
- 作爲Voter收益派給vlPNP：25%
3.2.4. 備註：vlPNP持有者視角：
以8月的vePendle收益爲例：
- Voter收益：60ETH (50%回購mpendle, 50%回購PNP作為voter reward發放)
- Base收益：151ETH (回購PNP用於賄賂)
vlPNP持有者收益（不含賄賂）：
- 當前規則：60ETH *0.5 = 30 ETH；
- 新分配規則下，vlPNP將獲得（60+151）*0.25 = 52.75 ETH。
所以，新分配方式并不會削減vlPNP的利益。再説，新分配方式還每月持續增持Penpie協議的vePendle存量來增加mPendle的内在價值和vlPNP的投票效力。
3.3. 提議LP Boosted rewards分配：
- 恢復20%抽成，以作爲事件後重新吸引LP的策略之一。
- 新的boosted rewards分配：
支援 @ksl 的計劃，如果團隊能參考並執行，願意購買更多的PNP質押投票推動該專案計畫。
並且為sufapie購買市場上的低價債權，為生態承擔部分的債權。
支持的原因數個
- 100%的承諾賠償受災戶U本位的損失
- 讓要求團隊也負起部分責任，支付鎖倉的團隊MGP份額用於為SUFA進行長期的賄賂，這也可以增加CAKEPIE的業務。
- PENPIE的中.長期損失控制在整體收入的10%
- 我們不再需要擔憂因為債務帶來的恐慌，將能持續成長讓協議變得更加安全，提高我們償還給受災戶的能力。
- 讓市場對MGP ECO有信心的機構/散戶，能夠承接債權，讓有資金需求的受災戶能夠以更好的價格換回損失的資產。
- SFP代幣以及賠償金庫可以有效的提供擔保，提高債權的價值。
以下舉多個案例:
a.當SFP治理代幣市場價格為1美元時，由於每3美元的債權消除可以獲得1顆SUFA代幣，當每1美元債權價格小於 1/3=0.33美元時，將會吸引投資人購買債權換取SUFA代幣套利。
b.由於MGP團隊有對SFP治理代幣於CAKEPIE進行賄賂，將對SFP代幣獲得一定的價值支撐。
c.當賠償金庫有270萬美元剩餘債權2700萬時，由於強盡的實質資產於金庫放置，用戶可以用10%的金額消除債權贖回賠償時，市場每1美元的債權價格將>0.1美元。
d.當市場投資人計算 SUFAPIE每年可以償還10%債務進入賠償金庫時，每個投資人都將有一個心理預期的價格去購買低價債權追求回報。
7.PENPIE有機會可以以更低的金額完成2700萬美元的賠償
8.PENPIE在賠償時有有價值的SFP代幣可以回饋給PENPIE生態的用戶，這次的賠償不會毫無意義。
9.未來MGP ECO將會變得更為安全，我們將有更大的能力應對未來的風險。
10.待2700萬美元的債務完全償還，這或許將成為一個創新的協議，可以對外擴展更多的業務，如保險債權發行等等…，也有機會跟審計公司進行合作，或許也可以長期的降低MGP ECO未來的審計費用。
以上種種因素都將大大提升我們對於償還債款的能力，損失的用戶可以選擇等待賠償金庫能100%償還時選擇申請賠償金，若急需用錢也可以用更好的比例換回損失，我相信這是對賠償用戶相當負責的計畫書。
為了推動該計畫的進行，將繼續購買PNP支持投票提案，當前已於事發後購買 12000顆以上的PNP了，將於之後市場開放全數鎖倉。若提案正式表決將購買更多的PNP用於支持。
希望能招集更多的持有者支持這項提案。
I think you meant to say “I strongly oppose the idea of providing compensation FROM PNP and mPendle holders” ?
I agree that if the community feels Penpie can’t survive long term, we should consider winding down the protocol, pausing the perpetual 2-year re-locking of vePendle, and allowing a mechanism for mPendle holders to redeem 1:1 into vePendle at expiration. In this scenario, hack victims would be compensated by the liquidation of Penpie’s treasury along with any VC funds Magpie Company is able to raise.
No way a subDAOs that is fully independent cover for penpie that got hacked using revenue, apy sharing or such. You will bring all of them down.
If you read the " Terms and Conditions", penpie or magpie are not responsible and don’t have an obligation to cover anything. Go read “8. Limitation of Liability”.
The best that happens here for the ecosystem is for penpie to be wound down or liquidated. With each user receiving their shares. Same as if any company get liquidated.
And to say that would hurt the ecosystem, it won’t. It is actually a good thing. The team got hacked and learned how to audit properly. New & existing subDAOs would get re-audited, which is good, and they will thrive.
Sorry for the loss, but the finances are above, there isn’t enough current or future money to cover it.
End of story.
I think the proposal is interesting
There is a huge mistake in this proposal.
It always address you should take what ever from pnp to compensate.
The responsible party is mgp team. So if you should take some from Somewhere, It should be from the mgp whole ecosystem, Not only from pnp.
Pnp is nothing but victim.
You can’t punish a victim only because he is near to where the hack happens.
我回复了，由于非常重要，所以用的比较强烈的语气，请见谅。
为什么这个提案里所有的赔偿主体都写的是pnp呢？第一责任主体是黑客犯罪，第二责任主体是mg p团队失职。那么要pnp社区单独承担一份责任的理由何在？只是因为恰巧离盗窃现场比较近吗。
责任主体对应赔偿诉求，
第1，团队应该尽量赔偿。
第二，如果要动用社区收入赔偿，应该是所有mg p生态，而不是pnp单独。
要pnp社区单独承担一份责任的理由何在？只是因为恰巧离盗窃现场比较近吗。你邻居被偷了，因为你住的比较近，所以需要你再次赔偿对吗？就是因为离现场比较近，在估值上已经遭受了损失，属于最大受害者之一。
凭什么现在还要再二次剥夺最大受害者呢？
没有这个道理
我認為希望團隊賠償的想法非常合理，或許我們可以在這裡提供希望團隊賠償的金額比例會非常的有幫助。
我先發起個頭我認為團隊賠償PNP IDO中的MGP中屬於團隊的比例是比較合理的比例。
2700萬X16.5% (MGP隸屬團隊的代幣分配) X20% (PNP中隸屬MGP的代幣分配)X61%(現在已解鎖的PNP比例) = 543510美元。
我認為團隊按照當時IDO的比例進行責任賠付是一件很合理的事情，相信運作至今團隊自身是能夠賠償這樣的金額的。
同時我也認為不該讓團隊負起過大的責任，理由是我們僅有這一個團隊能夠執行開發維護MGP ECO，團隊IDO比例已經遠遠低於業界的標準，子DAO IDO時也沒有團隊的獨佔額，既然團隊在初期願意分享更多的收益給投資人，我想在這種時候我們更應該保護團隊，以便讓他們願意繼續維持優良傳統。
需要説明的是，這個計劃書的核心宗旨在於讓Penpie協議能在最小傷害的情況下還清債務，以及讓Magpie MegaDao生態有個更安全更保險的賠償機制，這有助於讓Magpie能更蓬勃的發展。
- 基於此次事件發生在Penpie，它將默認參與保險計劃以便讓債務轉移至Safupie，此計劃書并沒有讓Penpie獨自面對事件，而是以未來SubDao的IDO和少許盈利來幫助Penpie。
- 此計劃書也强調現有的SubDao將可以選擇加不加入保險計劃，并沒有强制性。
- 雖然未來的SubDao將是自動加入保險計劃並持續貢獻少許盈利，可得到的好處也是顯著的。假設再次發生駭客事件，Safupie將提供立刻援助，并且在大多數時候，參與的協議也能得到SFP代幣作爲回饋，并且vlSFP也能獲得質押收益。
- 另外，此計劃書也提供了一個新的Penpie收益分配重組的思路，核心是以持續增持vePendle來提升mPendle的内在價值以及vlPNP的投票權。
- vlPNP持有者的直接收益，Voter apy，并沒有在此新分配方式減少。
The core purpose of this proposal is to enable the Penpie protocol to repay its debts with minimal damage and to provide the Magpie MegaDao ecosystem with a safer and more secure compensation mechanism, which will help Magpie grow more vigorously.
- Since the incident occurred within Penpie, it will automatically participate in the insurance plan to transfer the debt to Safupie. This proposal does not leave Penpie to face the incident alone but rather aims to help Penpie through future SubDao IDOs and modest profits.
- The proposal also emphasizes that existing SubDaos can choose whether or not to join the insurance plan; there is no compulsion.
- Although future SubDaos will automatically join the insurance plan and continuously contribute a small portion of their profits, the benefits they receive will be significant. In the event of another hacking incident, Safupie will provide immediate assistance, and in most cases, participating protocols will also receive SFP tokens as a reward, with vlSFP also earning staking yields.
- Additionally, this proposal offers a new approach to restructuring Penpie’s revenue distribution, focusing on continuously increasing holdings of vePendle to enhance the intrinsic value of mPendle and the voting power of vlPNP.
- The direct benefits for vlPNP holders, such as voter APY, are not reduced under this new distribution method.
of course, thanks.
Fixed that
实际上，我认为让所有的投资人均摊这一损失是最好的方案。这听起来很疯狂，并且肯定不会通过社区投票，只有可能团队来操作，但请听我的理由，团队可以考虑：
我们参与defi是一个高风险的活动，当初选择penpie是因为有magpie的背书，觉得penpie属于一个更大的集团，这会让我们投资者有安全感。如果各个子dao独立运营互不干涉，出事magpe没有用它的优势来帮助子dao，那这个子dao跟一般的土狗项目并无区别，他是“magpie旗下”这个背书将毫无意义。再站在投资者的角度看，我们把钱放在defi dapp里面，当我们不知道出事的是不是我们自己的池子时，**如果给我们两个选择：有10%的风险失去全部的本金；或者出事时，失去10%的本金，大家会选择哪一个？我相信所有人会选择第二个，因为这相当于我们所有人花了10%的钱买了保险。**如果现在有一个大型defi项目（注意是大型，有大体量资金的），直接明确说发生安全事故时，所有池子均摊损失，我会倾向于把资金放到他那边。因为每一个人都有可能成为倒霉鬼，失去100%的本金，这是所有人不愿意承受的，但是最多只失去部分本金，这会让所有投资者不会面临这个不能承受的重量。而集团的总资金体量越大，旗下子dao越多，这个方法会越有效，假设，旗下所有子dao有100亿的资金，发生了一起500万美元的盗窃案，所有人均摊，每个人损失很少，但不会产生任何不能承受的重量。这对于“不能承受的损失””才是让大部分defi农民吓跑的原因。集团的意义是给所有子dao的投资者做一个保险的角色。甚至于这个事故后，团队可以把这一方案写入安全策略中并展示给所有投资者。请团队认真考虑这个意见。谢谢。
是的我也認同您的部分觀點，0.01%機會造成100%的損失跟，0.1%的機會造成10%的損失我也會選擇後者。
但如果希望全部人賠償或許我們需要更柔和的方式，而非採取強硬的行為。
我們或許需要先認知到項目合夥人跟客戶的差異。
是的，然而这也是这个社区投票对被盗池子的客户来说绝对不公平的原因。因为其他来提意见的人很多可能没有受损失或者是其他子dao的，他们不希望自己的利益受损，这是可以理解的。但是让所有人投票，95%没受损失的人甚至想投票1分钱都不要赔，因为不关他们的事。团队当然可以这样处理，但以后不会再有任何人敢把钱存进来。因为出事没有任何保障。
This looks pretty obvious to anyone at least using a bare amount of logic.
Thinking about winding down PNP would kill any trust in the whole magpie eco. Stop thinking about your 100$ in cakepie, there are millions at stake from big investors and if they don’t trust the team, the protocol is DEAD
There is way more at stake than just penpie but it looks hard to understand to siloed minds
Don’t even think about touching other subdao. This will definitely kill all trust in Magpie ECO.
"In reality, I believe the best solution is to have all investors share the loss. This may sound crazy and would certainly not pass a community vote, it’s something that can only be done by the team. But please hear me out. The team could consider this:
Investing in DeFi is a high-risk endeavor. We chose Penpie initially because of the backing of Magpie, feeling that Penpie was part of a larger group, which gave us a sense of security. If each sub-DAO operates independently without interfering with each other, and Magpie does not use its advantages to help the sub-DAO in case of trouble, then this sub-DAO is no different from an ordinary rug-pull project. The endorsement of “being under Magpie” would be meaningless.
From an investor’s perspective, when we put our money into a DeFi dapp, and when we don’t know if it’s our own pool that’s having trouble, if given two choices: a 10% risk of losing all our principal; or in case of an incident, losing 10% of the principal, which would everyone choose? I believe everyone would choose the second option, as it’s like all of us spending 10% to buy insurance. If there’s a large DeFi project (note that it’s large, with a significant amount of funds) that explicitly states that in the event of a security incident, all pools will share the loss, I would be inclined to put my funds there. Because everyone could potentially be the unlucky one, losing 100% of their principal, which is something no one wants to bear. But losing at most only a portion of the principal would mean that all investors would not face this unbearable weight. And the larger the total funds of the group and the more sub-DAOs it has, the more effective this method will be. For example, if all the sub-DAOs under the group have 10 billion in funds, and there’s a theft of 5 million dollars, if everyone shares the loss, each person loses very little, and no one has to bear an unbearable burden. This is what scares most DeFi farmers away from “unbearable losses”. The role of the group is to provide insurance for all investors in the sub-DAOs. The team could even write this plan into the security policy after the incident and present it to all investors.
I urge the team to seriously consider this suggestion. Thank you."
i think the situation more complex and debt is so heavy but the option of handle is easy
promise to investors and lpers:
1、old mechanism everything as normal as before
2、do not effect or relate with other subdao
promise to victim and try to get trust back again
1、the fault of team(penpie/magpie)
2、compensation all but must be delay
3、why not take income to compensate now?
we are so early and small. income is also be, even take all earning to compensate is still nottttttt enough.
if we take all earning away to compensate now, we will die immediately
we must to be alive now and earning more to loop with small step to compensate in the future
4、setting/publish a income number(e.g.1000E) for every month, when the number reach and begin to compensate
5、external money from other places which will be pendle team/partner/vc and so on to first compensate a part of total debt is better
People might make the choice of 10% shared loss EX ANTE, i.e. before the incident occurred. EX POST, i.e. after the incident occurred, you simply cannot commingle funds from different pools if this agreement wasn’t already in place beforehand and absolutely clear to everyone involved. Even a government vote cannot do this as the governance process doesn’t have the right to decide over user funds. We all held individual safe deposit boxes in a bank vault which got compromised. Just because your safe deposit box was broken into, doesn’t entail you to a portion of the funds in the un-compromised box next to you. If the team goes down this route, it will almost surely lead to litigation.