Penpie incident Overview and Request for Compensation Suggestions

Hello Community,

I am both affected and hold multiple subdao vl tokens and some more liquidity in other pools as well as eigenpie.

My main and upmost concern/request this is a clear failure from the team to properly isolate risks between pools. The hack was about to drain everyone !!! If it wasn’t for pendle.

So… TEAM SHOULD SELL OR OTC ANY CURRENT AND FUTURE ASSETS TO COMPENSATE USERS ASAP!

Otherwise NOTHING ELSE MATTERS (yes metallica lol). Not our vl tokens not any upcoming TGES NOTHInG!

Nobody in DEFI Would want to touch MAGPI ecosystem with a 10ft pole !!
For the people crying about cashflow or governance allocated tokens
ARE YOU GUYS MENTALLY CHALLENGED OR SOMETHING ??? ALL THOSE THINGS WILL BE $0! WITHOUT TRUST FROM LP AND DEFI COMMUNITY

You think TVL comes from trees or something???

TEAM HELLO?! WAKE UP !! SHOW YOUR CARDS! HOW MUCH MONEY ARE YOU ABLE TO RAISE ??

eigenpie on Binance very good. Sell your share. You fucked up you don’t deserve the millions while your failure cost innocent people millions. Sell your share to binance and compensate NOW as much as possible.

Other than that you can write 10000 post mortem and silly proposals for 3 years (LOL) none of those would restore any credibility to your team.

Yours sincerely just a nobody :slight_smile:

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Dear all,

Thank you all for your great contributions. Below I describe what I believe are the principles that should guide the Magpie team in this situation.

Disclaimer: I am personally affected by the hack and have suffered a significant loss.

Guiding Principles

  • Users of the Penpie protocol who have lost money as a result of the hack should be compensated. This is important for ethical reasons, but also to maintain user confidence in the Penpie protocol and the Magpie ecosystem.
  • If affected users cannot be compensated directly via treasury funds/cooperation with Binance/other, compensation must be spread over a longer period of time.
  • To generate future positive cash flow, the Magpie ecosystem should remain viable and attractive. Payments to affected users should not threaten the viability of the protocol.
  • The primary responsibility for the hack lies with the Penpie-Magpie team. By extension, this means that the Penpie protocol and the Magpie protocol are the primary responsible parties.
  • Governance token holders are not responsible for the hack. However, the valuation of the governance tokens and the income provided to governance token holders reflect the health of their protocol.
  • vePendle token holders are not responsible for the hack, although they are dependent on the survival of the Penpie protocol for future profits. It is in the best interest of vePendle holders to redirect some of their income to the affected users.
  • The Magpie protocol is taking a huge risk by covering the start-up costs of new SubDAOs. Estimates in the first post put this at around $2 million per calendar year. In return for this risk, the Magpie protocol should be able to receive a share of the TGE and future cash flows from these protocols.
  • Other subdaos are not responsible for losses incurred by Magpie users. However, other subdaos operate under the Magpie umbrella and can only be successful if the Magpie ecosystem itself is successful. Therefore, it is in the best interest of other SubDAOs to ensure that hacks to other SubDAOs are compensated.

Based on the above assumptions, the order of responsibility for compensating those hacked is as follows

    1. the Penpie/Magpie team, 2) PNP token holders, 3) MGP token holders, 4) users who benefit from the Penpie ecosystem, 5) subdaos that have not yet had their TGE, 6) subdaos that have had their TGE and are currently fully functional.

At this stage, I am unable to provide specific details and percentages as to what I believe would be fair for each user group/sub-group to provide. These should be determined based on the prioritisation above and the market environment.

Thank you all again for your comments and I hope this post has contributed to the discussion,
Kind regards,
Shrimpie

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No objections to venting your emotions, but I need to clarify one point: Magpie team does not hold any shares in any of the subDAOs; the shares belong to the treasury.

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我不認為團隊有權力不經由DAO同意來進行賠償,這些資產都是隸屬於DAO的,我們DAO可以先向LP受災戶理賠,之後再向團隊索取對方則任內的賠償。
如果團隊可以不經由DAO的同意就進行如此重大的決策,那麼或許我們不該叫DAO,而應該叫MGP公司。

@PenpieExploitee 所以我們才更需要成立mgp eco的保險金庫,透過事前收取固定的費用並寫入白皮書,避免未來事發後繁瑣的賠償流程,影響到項目的誠信及運作。

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这个提案非常棒。

尝试通过创建一个债权市场,用完全市场化的方式解决债权。在这个过程中兼顾了各方的利益:

  1. LP 持有者:获得了足额的偿还承诺,并且偿债现金流来自magpie/penpie以及后续自愿加入的subdao的协议收入。请注意,不要只用静态的视角看待它,这部分收入(尤其是来自penpie的收入)在未来是极具爆发力的。
  2. PNP/mPendle持有者:虽然需要做出妥协,拿出部分收入用来赔偿(请注意,pnp/mpendle holder在这个事件中没有任何过错),但是这样的妥协换来了penpie协议的继续运行。并且,方案中的收入分配方式变化,强化了对其底层资产vependle的控制,为以后penpie的协议收入的增长打下坚实基础。
  3. Magpie生态及其中的subdao:首先,对于其他subdao而言,这不是一个强制性的方案,subdao完全可以通过治理投票的方式选择不加入。其次,如果选择加入,也相当于获得了某种协议保险。在衡量成本和收益之后,选择权在各个subdao。对于整个Magpie生态而言,可以有机会建立起一个生态级别的保险机制,增强生态的抗风险能力。
  4. Magpie运营团队:作为本次黑客时间的第一责任人,Magpie团队应当负有完全的责任。但是,由于团队收入很少,使得偿还债务变成了Magpie团队的沉重负担,如果要求团队即时赔付,势必是不可能完成的任务。通过此提案,为团队提供了喘息的机会,只要团队拿出足够的诚意和担当拿出方案的启动资源,团队就有可能完成偿债这个mission impossible.

值得重点强调的是,penpie协议的最重要资产是其底层掌握的vependle,既不是吸引来的LP/TVL数据,也不是magpie团队的其他赋能。而且,penpie协议的治理权在vlpnp。各方在考虑可能方案的时候需要清醒的认识到这一点。

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pnp/mpendle不仅没有任何过错,同时也是受害者。如果一定要拿出部分收益用于赔偿,也不是当下。因为收入太少,分到受害人的钱也非常少,反而还会打击holder的信心。

可以考虑设定一个阀值,当月收益达到某个值时(如500E),再将%用于赔偿,这是可以接受的。

penpie的vependle已经占了37%,这几乎是垄断级别的存在,一旦pendle收入再次起 飞,所得收入也会指数级增长,到时再赔,对受害者和holders,都更能接受。

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MGP, as a unified state, with its subDAOs acting like regions in need of support from their government, must come together to assist those affected. Compensation should be distributed from all available resources within the ecosystem to restore trust and strengthen the community.

Distribute debt tokens to the affected users in proportion to the amount of damage incurred, and create a special yield pool for them. This pool will be funded by various resources, such as platform fees, part of the yield from all MGP ecosystem pools, and a portion of future IDO tokens. Initial liquidity can come from the funds spent on the audit of the compromised smart contracts, which should be returned since the work was not successfully completed. The yield pool will close once full compensation has been paid out. A portion of profits from strategic partnerships should also be included.

Access to this pool will be available only with the debt tokens, allowing affected users to receive compensation through yield. For those who do not wish to wait, they can sell their debt tokens on the market for immediate compensation. The payout period could be set at around two years, with a minimum return of 120% to account for global inflation. The compensation amount should be fixed in USD as of the moment of the exploit. In a bull market, the payout speed could potentially be accelerated.

This structure offers affected users a choice: either wait for compensation through the debt tokens or sell them on the market for immediate reimbursement. Just my thoughts.

和平讨论啊。

我们理解:
第1步,要确认责任方和承担方,
第2步,谈是否赔偿及基础方案,
第3步,才是百分比等等赔偿方案细节。而不是说现在就匆匆忙忙进入细节。
就像团队现在主要工作方向是黑客追踪及审计,而不是匆匆忙忙来和社区沟通一样,每一步都要尽量稳重,而不是试图跳跃几步到下一阶段。

我们理解:
第一责任方是黑客犯罪,
第二责任方是mgp团队失职。
如果不能就责任方达成一致,可以先讨论透彻。达成一致,则进入下一步骤。

下面讨论基准方案:
赔偿主体只能是mgp,任何在方案里定义penpie为赔偿主体的,无论方案看起来多么对pnp社区有利,都在基准上出了问题。

名不正则言不顺,pnp社区不能糊里糊涂的背上奇奇怪怪的责任,继遭遇不可抗力灾难之后,再惨遭pua。

没有理由说,因为pnp社区仅仅因为离地震比较近,就要负责赔偿不可抗力天灾的损失。

也许有人会说:因不可抗力造成的天灾损失,pnp社区只能自认倒霉。那么团队可以把这一套天灾理论来向受损lp用户宣贯,看看他们是否愿意自认倒霉。如果能够沟通成功,那就太好了。

如果没有把握向受损lp用户沟通成功的话,为何要来向pnp社区推销这套理论呢?仅仅因为pnp社区比较积极配合,愿意提供帮助团队吗?

好人就该被拿枪指着吗?

Pnp社区比较能接受的方案是:

  1. M gp团队作为主责方之一,先把责任担起来,200万个mgp也就是14万美元,不足以宣告这一诚意。

  2. 如果要社区协助,pnp,ckp等等,所有社区的协助比例应该是一样的,而这个协助需要团队去向各社区沟通解决。

而不是说由于地震发生在pn p这里,就要pnp负担更多的责任。如果是这套天灾理论的话,麻烦把这套天灾理论去向受损lp用户说,看看他们是否能接受,而不是来pua愿意帮助团队的pnp社区。

好人,不该被拿枪指着。

Let’s discuss peacefully.

We understand:

The first step is to confirm the responsible party and the party responsible,

The second step is to discuss whether to compensate and the basic plan,

The third step is the percentage and other details of the compensation plan. Instead of rushing into the details now.

Just like the team’s main work direction now is hacker tracking and auditing, rather than rushing to communicate with the community, each step should be as steady as possible, rather than trying to jump a few steps to the next stage.

We understand:

The first responsible party is the hacker crime,

The second responsible party is the MGP team’s dereliction of duty.

If you can’t reach an agreement on the responsible party, you can discuss it thoroughly first. If you reach an agreement, go to the next step.

Let’s discuss the benchmark plan:

The compensation subject can only be MGP. Anyone who defines penpie as the compensation subject in the plan, no matter how beneficial the plan seems to be to the PNP community, has a problem in the benchmark.

If the name is not right, the words will not flow. The PNP community cannot be confused and bear strange responsibilities. After encountering force majeure disasters, it will be miserable. PUA.

There is no reason to say that the PNP community should be responsible for compensating for the losses caused by force majeure natural disasters just because it is close to the earthquake.

Some people may say: The PNP community can only admit that they are unlucky for the losses caused by natural disasters due to force majeure. Then the team can promote this set of natural disaster theories to the affected LP users to see if they are willing to admit that they are unlucky. If the communication is successful, that would be great.

If you are not sure that you can successfully communicate with the affected LP users, why should you promote this theory to the PNP community? Just because the PNP community is more actively cooperating and willing to help the team?

Should good people be pointed at with guns?

The solution that the PNP community can accept is:

  1. As one of the main responsible parties, the MGP team should take the responsibility first. 2 million MGPs, or 140,000 US dollars, is not enough to declare this sincerity.

  2. If community assistance is required, PNP, CKP, etc., the assistance ratio of all communities should be the same, and this assistance requires the team to communicate with each community to resolve.

Instead of saying that because the earthquake happened here, PNP should bear more responsibility. If it is this natural disaster theory, please tell this natural disaster theory to the affected LP users to see if they can accept it, instead of pua the PNP community that is willing to help the team.

Good people should not be pointed at with guns.

目前团队可以协调的社区一共有3个,其基本态度在这几天的讨论里展示如下:

lp用户:
d90c为代表的lp用户这几天来到 Telegram中文群,发出声音,其基本诉求是要求赔偿,要求每年赔偿,可以购买一定的pnp来投票。
这一部分用户需要沟通,基本沟通方向可以是借市场流动性力量发债化债,拉长还债周期,也可以是其他方向。

pnp社区:
虽然声音复杂,但已经展示出了很大的诚意,愿意和团队一起共渡难关。
这并非套话,而是因为购买pnp及锁仓vlpnp这个动作本身就是大筛选器,通过了这个筛选的人才会成为pnp社区,那它自然就是天然的整体展示出对团队的信任和好感,以及愿意帮助团队。
这几天pnp社区的讨论不是集中在是否还债,而是集中在如何还债,且有初步提案给出,这说明了pnp社区的道德水准及能力。
但社区展示的善意不是持续被剥削的理由,如果要还债的话,应该是所有子道社区相同比例,不应因为不可抗力灾难发生在某处,就持续剥削某处。比如某地发生了地震,难道不应该各方救援该地,而应该持续剥削该地更多?

其他子道用户:
基本态度是,干脆赖账,如果要还债就别来沾边我们。
这个态度也很好理解,站在自己的利益立场上,且目光较为短浅,这部分人需要mgp团队通过耐心细致的沟通和其他手段来说服,和mgp团队一起共度难关。

At present, there are 3 communities that the team can coordinate. Their basic attitudes are shown in the discussions in the past few days as follows:

lp users:
lp users represented by d90c have come to the Telegram Chinese group in the past few days to make their voices heard. Their basic demands are to demand compensation, and they demand compensation every year. They can buy a certain amount of pnp to vote.
This part of users needs to communicate. The basic communication direction can be to use the market liquidity to issue bonds to convert debts, extend the debt repayment cycle, or other directions.

pnp community:
Although the voices are complicated, they have shown great sincerity and are willing to overcome difficulties with the team.
This is not a cliché, but because the action of buying pnp and locking vlpnp is itself a big filter. Only those who pass this filter will become pnp communities, and then it is naturally a natural overall display of trust and goodwill for the team, as well as willingness to help the team.
The discussion in the pnp community in the past few days is not focused on whether to repay the debt, but on how to repay the debt, and there are preliminary proposals, which shows the moral standards and capabilities of the pnp community.
But the goodwill shown by the community is not a reason to continue to be exploited. If the debt is to be repaid, it should be the same proportion for all Zidao communities. We should not continue to exploit a certain place just because a force majeure disaster occurs in a certain place. For example, if an earthquake occurs in a certain place, shouldn’t all parties rescue the place, but continue to exploit the place more?

Other Zidao users:
The basic attitude is to simply default on the debt. If you want to repay the debt, don’t get involved with us.
This attitude is also easy to understand. Standing on their own interests and with a short-sighted vision, these people need the mgp team to persuade them through patient and meticulous communication and other means to overcome difficulties together with the mgp team.

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這算是目前爲止考慮比較全面的方案,只是還有一點就是對受影響的LP們少了點友善。明白團隊的200wMGP份額只是用作賄賂,若是能再撥出一些直接賠償LP們,再加上這個方案後續債權補償,那麽就更好了。

不是很明白你想達到的目的或者傳達的信息,若只是想指責MGP團隊的話,其實沒什麽意思。解決事情才是最重要的。而且看樣子你是想將Penpie排除在賠付主體之外?并且拉其他subdao下海?

我並沒有參與其他subdao,我只持有PNP和mPendle,我不懂他們社群如何想的,可我覺得你的想法有些不切實際。你不能把責任推給MGP團隊后就把Penpie排除在賠付之外的。

LP們的資金是放在Penpie裏,主要責任除了你説的黑客(其實也不能說黑客的責任,黑客是犯罪者),就是Penpie協議。對的,是Penpie協議而非Penpie Dao。Penpie協議本身才是主要責任。

而牽涉到MGP團隊。是因爲他們負責運作Penpie協議。我們可以問責MGP團隊,可是真正要對LP們負責賠償的是Penpie協議本身。所以現在是看MGP團隊如何利用Penpie協議裏的資金做賠償,Penpie協議本身根本無法排除在賠付主體之外!

而如果不想賠償導致Penpie協議一蹶不振,我覺得ksl的方案就很有啓發性,可以通過債務轉移把Penpie的傷害降到最低。不過團隊應該要撥出一筆資金做首次賠償,這樣對受害的LP們比較友善。

Thank you Desmen and the Magpie Team for all your hard work to protect our funds during these difficult times.

You’re swift and diligent efforts made sure that this didn’t balloon into a far worse situation.

This incident has greatly affected me financially so i very much appreciate everything you have done and your tireless dedication.

Thank you also for your open call for suggestions on compensation.

Your focus on openness and transparency is definitely to be admired in such an industry like crypto.

So far we’ve had healthy discussions on a way forward, thanks to all that have participated.

But we can’t go any further without knowing one very important piece of information from the team.

In what way will Magpie support the compensation plan ?

The community can ask for the moon and stars but if the team rage quits that will be a sad ending.

Please let us know because without this information it will be hard for the community to propose something realistic that you would accept.

Further I’ll suggest that the community wait for the team to respond before making any new proposals or modifying any existing ones.

There is no point until we get parameters that they will agree to.

Desmen and the Magpie Team please let us know what type of support will be given to the compensation plan ?

Thank you in advance,

Joey Copper

1 Like

It’s a bad proposal, which only care about the LPer’s intersts and ignore/hurt PNP&mPendle holders’ intersts.

  1. Why 110% compensation? LPer’s stake and get reward, then also should take kind of risks. Even the deposit insurance of traditional bank, there is a ceiling for the compensation (250K USD in USA). The LPers clearly know Defi’s a high risk, why also expect to 100% (if not 110%) compensation!? For the point, I suggest setting a Max amount of compensation (such 250K USD) or a percentage of compensation (30%-50% of total loss).
  2. Why use PNP rewards for compensation? PNP/mPendle investor (except Magpie team) has no obligations for the compensation, they did nothing wrong. The compensation may comes as goodwill of PNP holders (perhaps 5%-10% as ksl’s proposal), but not obligations. You can ask for the Magpie protocal’s or Magpie team’s PNP reward for compensation, but not other holders/investors’ PNP/mPendle rewards.
  3. If any proposal intend to claim that PNP/mPendle has obligations for compensation, I can only tell you that PNP holders will reject the proposal by Governance Voting.

Let put it this way, Penpie’s most important assets are vePendle, not LP/TVL, not Magpie’s operation. If you don’t care about the intersts of PNP/mPendle’s, PNP/mPendle holders will also tell you by governace voting that we do not care about your intersts at all.

这是一个糟糕的提议,它只关心LPer的利益,忽视且严重损害了PNP和mPendle持有人的利益。

1.为什么是110%的补偿?LPer的通过质押得到回报,那么也应该承担相应的风险。即使是传统银行的存款保险,也有赔偿上限(美国为25万美元)。LPers清楚地知道Defi的高风险特性,这种情况下还要指望100%(如果不是110%)的赔偿!?对于这一点,我建议设定最高赔偿金额(如25万美元)或设定最高的赔偿比例(总损失的30%-50%)。

2.为什么使用PNP奖励作为补偿?PNP/mPendle投资者(Magpie团队除外)没有赔偿义务,他们没有做错任何事。补偿可能来自PNP持有人的善意(比如 ksl提议中的5%-10%),但这不是义务。你可以要求Magpie协议或Magpie团队的PNP奖励作为补偿,但不能要求其他持有人/投资者的PNP/mPendle奖励。

3.如果任何提案声称PNP/mPendle有义务进行赔付,我只能告诉你,PNP持有人将通过治理投票拒绝该提案。

这么说吧,Penpie最重要的资产是vePendle,而不是LP/TVL,也不是Magpie团队的运营。如果你不关心PNP/mPendle的利益,PNP持有人也会用投票告诉你,我们才不关心你的利益。

4 Likes

你的方案很大程度代表了受害LP们的看法,我觉得MGP团队有必要重视。可是你的建议会大幅削减了Penpie的潜力,我们可以有更好的方式,例如ksl的方案。

我们可以尝试讨论并改进ksl的方案,让大家都能达到一个共识。既然你愿意在这里,我相信你是愿意聆听大家意见的。

1 Like

pnp可以作为协助方,但其所应当承担的责任不应超出其他子道的比例,因为同样无责。不应因为地震发生在某处,就由某处作为赔偿主体。

您把pnp协议,团队,和社区,这三者割裂开来,单独要求pnp协议承担责任。假设我们也同意由协议承担责任,那么一串代码构成的协议如何承担此责任呢?

不会一开始说着协议承担责任,绕来绕去又是pnp社区,扛下了所有吧🤣

We demand that Penpie:

-Full return of principal and rewards at 100% for the mining pools affected by this incident
-All payouts need to be completed by the end of September 2024

This is great if it can happen, but how, and with what money

I think that Defiwhale proposal makes an excellent starting point and should be the base to build on.

The pros:

  • The profitability of the other subDAOs isn’t impacted
  • The team takes an hit in form of MGP, as they are responsible for what happened
  • 110% is even erring on the safe side considering the loss of APR for a couple years. Probably might ask for more, but i think it’s reasonable.
  • The impact on PNP is mitigated (thinking that a PNP holder won’t get an hit is pretty naive, and i have a load of PNP)

Tweaks:

  • I would swap the assets in the treasury in eth/USDC pro rata (considering hacked funds are both eth and USDe/gUSDC), otherwise it would be impossible to have a correct pricing). It’s 2% or so of the stolen assets, so it’s just a dip, but at least will give a starting point
  • This also helps some possible OTCs considering the relative large size of the above treasury, instead of hitting hundreds of wallet that will get 1-2 PNPs
  • I would think of moving some of incoming DAOs TGE into this, from the team stash of course. Might be in a locked 1y form or so, but the team should pay the price

(If it’s not clear, i respect MGP team, but in the end you are at fault here)

For larger wallets, it might be nice to have a gentlemen agreement of a form of lock of some of the assets, as it happened in CRV’s hack in 2023. Nothing enforced, but you probably talking about 7-8 individuals that have way above average stash and understanding of the market. They will accept it

Finally, replying to some funny stuff above, thinking that the LPers should take the hit for good or for 50-60% of the amount lost is a quick way to kill Magpie forever, as stated multiple times. Whales will instadump everything, revenues go to zero and to “protect” your 500$ investment you will lose 450$ of it, if not worse

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該提案對于MGP ECO將帶來長期性的風險,
首先當一個協議被強制剝奪40%/50%的協議收入時將使幣價價值長期帶來>40/50%的下跌。
這將讓MGP ECO暴露在治理攻擊的風險中,別忘了PNP的核心資產為vePENDLE。
我們假設PNP的價格因為50%收益被剝奪導致價格長期降為0.5美元,
個別的幾個鯨魚就可以利用PNP的協議收入不斷的購買因為賠償提案導致幣價下跌的PNP,
若你們持續收購明顯遠低於實際價值的PNP,在未來有可能對PENPIE造成不利的影響,並開始操縱PENPIE的提案,這很明顯不符合去中心化的精神。
若真要以這麼高比例手續費收入賠償,我認為不可以以現金流的方式賠償,而是應該存入金庫待100%累積到完整資產後才開放理賠。
同時我不認為砸盤PNP治理代幣是個威脅,首先PENPIE的核心資產是VEPENDLE,PNP的幣價沒有太大的意義,只要VEPENDLE能持續創造價值,PNP始終會回歸他應有的價格。
若你們打算砸盤PNP我將感到遺憾,但我認為這沒有剝奪PENPIE協議收入50%嚴重。

同時你們的提案對于MGP持有者也相當的不尊重,MGP DAO僅持有20%的PNP你們卻要求MGP協議要長期負擔40%的協議收入用於賠償。
你們口口聲聲說這是為了協議的長久發展而提出的提案,但我目前只看到各了個人損失威脅要將協議帶入深淵,MGP ECO生態也是受害者之一,你們的怒火應該朝向駭客。

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With all due respect.

This compensation proposal is somewhat naive - to expect LP providers to receive more than full recovery on a defi protocol is entirely unrealistic.

This is not FTX, and we’re not under U.S. jurisdiction. We’re not covered by Chapter 11 protection.

The common consensus is - if you put your assets on chain, there are inherent and significant risks in exchange for higher yields than TradFi.

To argue that LP whales have leverage (or one may define as borderline threatening) over Penpie is even more absurd - Penpie will survive as long as Pendle survive (i.e. vePENDLE as its main source of income).

To strip away 50% of its main source of income for the foreseeable future, however, will put this protocol on its deathbed.

Penpie is not the perpetrator, but the victim. Go after the hacker instead of hammering down on the victim.

I agree with your conclusion for this proposal, yet there are other (and better) alternatives that also prioritizes user recovery AND (truly) ensuring the protocol’s success and sustainability.

KSL’s proposal is more sustainable - plus it echoes with what Vitalik has said in its recent tweet on Sep 19 2024:

“Insurance DAOs are underrated imo. N people worried about similar risks pool capital together and agree to cover anyone who suffers from the risk. The symmetric model ensures less imbalance of incentives.”
( Source: https://x.com/VitalikButerin/status/1836622619841564733 )

Perhaps we should use KSL’s proposal as a starting point, and scrutinize the particulars to find the middle ground.

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For tax reasons, it would be really helpful for me if any compensation plan would come in the same token. In my case ageth, or for the penpie ecosystem maybe more suitable 26 Dec Pendle LP ageth.