Penpie’s previous revenue model was built around vePENDLE-powered yield boosts. That model is gone. Using that as justification to distribute all treasury PENDLE is effectively arguing for a shutdown.
Distributing PENDLE does not “unlock value” — it liquidates the protocol. Without treasury PENDLE, Penpie cannot participate in sPENDLE, cannot generate revenue, and cannot justify continued development. That path ends here.
The OSTR DAT is the alternative. It keeps PENDLE as protocol capital, transitions it into sPENDLE, and restores a revenue engine under the new Pendle structure. Value is then recycled through clearly defined mechanisms — mNAV-based taxation, mandatory OSTR buybacks, and controlled liquidity management — instead of being extracted in a one-off distribution.
mPENDLE already served its purpose by capturing revenue during the vePENDLE era a=in addition to direct rewards on PENDLE Rush campaigns which many users sold directly to make gain. OSTR is not taking that away; it restructures the system so Penpie can continue operating in the sPENDLE era.
This is a choice between liquidation and continuation. Supporting the OSTR DAT means choosing continuation.
The real question isn’t whether distributing PENDLE ownership to PNP holders is acceptable or not.
The real question is simple:
Does this proposal/initiative create a genuine product that gives new users a reason to voluntarily stake fresh PENDLE under OSTR / Penpie going forward?
If this proposal does not create real demand from new users, then it is not a growth initiative. It is simply a redistribution of existing assets through governance and UI.
Let’s be honest about history.
PNP was designed to capture value from a single, very specific mechanism: vePENDLE-powered yield boosts and bribes. That era is over. Anyone who invested in PNP should have understood that returns were explicitly conditional on vePENDLE continuing to exist — unlike protocols such as SD or MGP, whose revenue engines are not dependent on a single veToken mechanism.
If the previous argument was that “mPENDLE holders accepted those terms when they converted their PENDLE into mPENDLE”, then the same logic applies here.
PNP holders must also accept the core risk of their investment: when vePENDLE dies, the business model dies with it.
If you now want to propose a new business by converting depositors’ assets, then once again the key questions are unavoidable:
Are you confident this conversion and new design will attract new deposits?
And if the answer is yes, how do you expect to attract new users to delegate their assets to a DAO that has demonstrated a forcibly remove ownership from legacy depositors. Trust is not declared — it is earned.
And forced conversion is the fastest way to destroy it.
mPENDLE was never a deposit and never an LST. When users converted PENDLE to mPENDLE, they explicitly exchanged away PENDLE ownership by design. There is no underlying PENDLE sitting in custody and no depositor claim to unwind. mPENDLE holders never had the option to “unlock” their PENDLE. If that were the case, I would have gone and bought mPENDLE on the secondary market and instantly unlocked the underlying vePENDLE. That’s just not how it works. That part of the history is settled.
PNP’s value capture was always conditional on vePENDLE continuing. When vePENDLE ended, that revenue engine ended with it. OSTR isn’t trying to rewrite that era, it’s a new strategy built for current reality, and it should be judged on one thing only: whether it creates real demand for new users to voluntarily allocate fresh PENDLE. Framing this as forced redistribution or broken trust is just applying the wrong mental model to how this system actually works.
We can’t go anywhere without addressing this PENDLE = 1 mPendle + 0.7837 PNP issue. If OSTR even goes forward, that cannot be the case because of what it does to Pendle depositors, who got mPendle and a tiny fraction of the PNP supply. It treats it as a donation to PNP.
Perhaps going ahead with OSTR would be fine, but we HAVE to fix this part, so OG Pendle depositors don’t get completely hosed, OG PNP holders come out ahead, and secondary market mPendle arbitragers also come out ahead. OG Pendle Depositors are the only reason PNP has any value at all, they can’t finish in last place here.
I am revisiting calculations of the split of assets to address this by separating out these 3 parties. I think it’s the only thing that could even make a conversion to OSTR tenable, but that’s useful for other options to as a starting point.
After reading through the thread, my concern remains unchanged.
I don’t see a concrete plan in this initiative that explains how and why new users would choose to deposit fresh PENDLE. What is clearly detailed are the mechanics and conversion math — specifically how previously deposited PENDLE (converted into mPENDLE) can continue to be utilized to support PNP holders under the new structure.
That’s a valid internal transition discussion, but it’s fundamentally different from presenting a strategy that generates net-new demand.
If this is the case, then it’s probably more honest to return to the fundamentals. PNP’s value capture was always singularly dependent on vePENDLE mechanics as its sole income source. Once that mechanism ceased to exist, that revenue engine effectively ended with it.
From that lens, this isn’t a temporary inefficiency that needs restructuring, but a business model that has reached its natural conclusion. Any new initiative should therefore be evaluated not on how well it preserves legacy exposure, but on whether it introduces a genuinely new source of demand and income.
Until that driver is clearly articulated, the proposal reads more like a continuity and redistribution plan for existing stakeholders than a growth-oriented product designed to attract fresh capital.
Happy to be proven wrong if there’s a section or follow-up that addresses this directly.
I’d also like to remind everyone that this protocol originated from the Magpie/Penpie builders themselves.
Given that, may I ask you to share the original risk assessment conducted when this protocol was first designed—specifically regarding the scenario where vePENDLE effectively “dies.”
I believe it’s important to clearly distinguish when governance voting is appropriate and when responsibility lies squarely with the builders and initiators.
Uniswap v2, v3, v4, Pendle—and possibly even sPENDLE—were not born out of governance votes.
They were design decisions made by builders, grounded in their original knowledge, vision, and ideals of DeFi, and carried with full accountability.
That responsibility should not be blurred or obscured behind a governance vote.
There are moral principles that go beyond governance outcomes, even if every voting right holder were to vote “yes.”
For this reason, governance should not be used to legitimize a breach of those principles.
I respectfully ask that PNP holders and mPENDLE holders not be positioned against one another.
What is your plan, roadmap, and risk management strategy for this protocol going forward?
Calling for a full PENDLE distribution is just dressing up a shutdown as “fairness.” Once vePENDLE ended, the old yield boost model ended with it — but that doesn’t mean the protocol’s capital suddenly became free loot.
Handing out treasury PENDLE doesn’t fix anything. It kills the only asset Penpie has to generate revenue in the sPENDLE era. No treasury PENDLE means no participation, no income, no reason for the protocol to exist beyond a final payout.
The OSTR DAT is the only proposal that actually adapts to reality instead of running from it. It keeps PENDLE where it belongs — as protocol capital — converts it into sPENDLE, and reestablishes a revenue loop through buybacks and disciplined treasury management. That’s how protocols survive transitions. Liquidation is not a strategy.
mPENDLE already captured value when Penpie was generating boosted yield. Pretending that entitles holders to the entire treasury now is pure value double-dipping at the expense of the protocol’s future.
This vote is simple: either intentionally end Penpie, or move forward with OSTR. Anyone pushing for full PENDLE distribution is voting for the former, whether they admit it or not.
I’d ask you to re-read my earlier proposal through a simple lens: it offers (1) a fair, pro-rata redemption queue and (2) a strictly capped, discounted tender that buys back mPENDLE only within a hard budget.
Together, those two lanes reduce the current mPENDLE/PNP basis drift and limit run-risk, while giving Penpie room to rebuild around sPENDLE as an opt-in growth path rather than a forced migration.
This is the only proposal on this thread that doesn’t pit mPENDLE and PNP holders against each other.
Manifesto for ePENDLE/mPENDLE Holders: The Path to a Fair Resolution
Preamble: As depositors and creditors of the Equilibria/Penpie protocolo, we seek a resolution that preserves the integrity of the DeFi ecosystem and respects fundamental property rights. We do not seek “favors,” but the recognition of the assets that back our tokens.
The 1:1 Principal Backing Every ePENDLE/mPENDLE tokens represents a 1:1 claim on the PENDLE held in the treasury. The “lock” is a time constraint, not a loss of ownership. Any proposal must honor the full principal of the depositors.
Hierarchy of Claims (Creditors First) In any financial restructuring, depositors take priority over equity holders (EQB/PNP). Using depositors’ collateral to fund new ventures or to bail out governance token holders is a breach of fiduciary duty.
No Ransom Tactics Holding assets at 0% yield to force a “haircut” (loss) is an act of bad faith. If the protocol cannot provide its original service, it must provide a transparent path to asset recovery.
The Yield-Bearing Asset Model (The Path Forward) We advocate for a solution inspired by the Lido (wstETH) model. If the protocol is to remain active, it must transition to a Yield-Bearing Asset where:
The token represents 1.00 PENDLE + all accumulated rewards.
Instead of manual distribution, the exchange rate of the token grows over time relative to PENDLE as yield is harvested.
This ensures that the intrinsic value of the receipt always stays at or above 1:1, protecting the holder’s position regardless of short-term secondary market volatility.
Protecting the Pendle Ecosystem We call upon Pendle Finance to ensure its partners uphold these standards. A failure here damages the reputation of the entire Pendle ecosystem and its liquid staking derivatives.
Conclusion: We will not accept socialized losses or a haircut to save equity holders. Full principal recognition + accrued yield is the only way forward.
Too bad you don’t have any governance power, since vlPNP is the governance token of this ecosystem. You should be happy that they do not propose sending all PENDLE tokens to vlPNP holders.
Unfortunately so many run-on paragraphs of information that was auto-generated by AI tools still does not convey much information.
What I see - Pendle decided to screw it’s biggest holders of tokens over by whatever backdoor games that were being played and decided to screw over the Penpie mPendle holders, using a restructure scam. Because of the 2 year lock of vePendle it’s not an immediate screw you, but the fact there is a proposal to get input on what to do means as a token owner we are screwed and will ultimately once again as a holder get left with an empty paper bag of nothing. The only difference is they are only going to drain it slower instead of all at once. The worst part is Pendle’s restructure of the incentives is all about favoring themselves clearly by screwing over mPendle owners, but as an added f*ck you to owners will be less returns to any current holders. So done with both Pendle and mPendle.