You act as if every mPENDLE minted received its proportional share of the total EQB supply.
Depositors only received a tiny fraction of that supply (the rush incentives). The rest of the supply went to the team, VCs, and liquidity miners.
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The DAT plan is the only path that respects how the mPENDLE conversion was structured. When users minted mPENDLE, they already exchanged away direct ownership of PENDLE and accepted a new asset with different properties, liquidity, and risks. Pushing for unconditional 1:1 redemption is essentially asking the protocol to reverse that trade after the fact, even though the underlying PENDLE is not sitting idle for instant withdrawal. A blanket 1:1 exit creates a run-risk dynamic and forces the system to socialize losses across everyone who remains.
Governance still matters here, just through PNP. Penpieâs forward path must be decided by the stakeholders who actually hold the governance mandate and responsibility for the protocolâs balance sheet and recovery plan. mPENDLE holders can advocate, but the decision framework cannot be âwhoever wants out fastest sets the terms.â The DAT plan is the disciplined option: it prioritizes stability, orderly recovery, and preserving long-term value instead of opening a redemption shortcut that could collapse the system.
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The facts are clear: PNP holders alone possess the governance mandate for this protocol. While any stakeholder is free to propose ideas, the final voting power resides strictly with the PNP community. If any party wishes to see their proposal pass, the only viable path is to secure sufficient PNP voting weight.
In essence, every discussion in this forum revolves around one single goal: gathering enough PNP governance support to pass a proposal. Any attempt to bypass the formal PNP voting process or to strip PNP of its governance authority is pure fantasy.
A fact often overlooked is that the vast majority of PNP holders also hold mPENDLE. Therefore, the proposal that wins the PNP vote will be the one that best balances the interests of all parties. Proposals that blindly emphasize only mPENDLEâs interests or only PNPâs interests are destined to be rejected by the governance vote, especially those designed for short-term mPENDLE arbitrage during this crisis.
Itâs still only at the draft stage, and I already think the direction is flawed. In my view, there are three possible paths:
- Earn high reputation: Continue to honor PNPâs commitments to mpendle effectivelyâfor example, by conducting unlimited buybacks of mpendle until it reaches 1.
- Maintain moderate reputation: Allow mpendle holders to exit freely at the price that existed before the spendle proposal was announced.
- Survival of the fittest: Why should I bear greater losses than you? If you disagree, outvote me.
If these options still arenât clear enough, I believe EQBâs latest EIP sets a good example worth referencing.
Yes, mpendle is indeed an outsiderâbut only because PNP explicitly made commitments to mp in the first place, which is why this âoutsiderâ exists at all.
As for the PRT issue: everyone understands that development costs, team incentives, and governance decisions have all been handled entirely by PNP. Therefore, I firmly believe outsiders should not be held responsible for any of these burdens.
If PNP incurs losses, I attribute that to the fact that spendle has diminished the value of governance itself.
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Hi everyone,
Iâve been following the heated discussions in Discord/Forum and reading the comparisons to other protocols (like Equilibria) closely. While I understand the frustration regarding entry prices and conversion rates, I believe we need to step back from the emotion and look at the hard math and technical reality.
After analyzing PIP #22 against the alternatives, I am writing this to express my support for the proposal. Here is why choosing this Pivot (OSTR) is significantly better than a âWind-Downâ or a lawsuit.
1. Immediate Liquidity vs. A 2-Year Prison Sentence Many are pointing to the Equilibria proposal as the âgold standard,â but they are missing the fine print. Their proposal requires users to permanently lock their assets for another 2 years to receive the âhonest haircut.â
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Equilibria: You are forced to hold through the bear/bull market for 2 years with zero liquidity. If PENDLE drops, you are stuck. Plus, you pay a 7.5% management fee on rewards.
Penpie PIP #22: We receive OSTR immediately. It is a liquid token. If you want to leave, you can sell on Day 1. If you believe in the pivot, you can hold.
- My take: I would rather have immediate freedom and liquidity than be forced into a 2-year lock-up just to facilitate a slow death.
2. The âHiddenâ Subsidy: PNP is Bailing Us In There is a narrative that mPENDLE holders are being robbed. The math shows the opposite. The proposal explicitly states that the Treasury is giving up 1.1 Million PNP (which belongs to the protocol side) and transferring that value directly to mPENDLE holders.
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Without this subsidy, our conversion rate would be strictly based on the mPENDLE in the treasury, which would be lower.
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The PNP side is effectively diluting its own treasury share to boost our conversion rate. This is a âbail-in,â not a theft.
3. The Technical Reality: âRedemptionâ is Impossible We need to accept that vePENDLE is time-locked on the blockchain.
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We cannot vote to âliquidateâ assets that are locked in smart contracts.
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We cannot vote to âredeemâ 1:1 because the peg was never guaranteed and is market-driven.
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Any demand to âjust give us the PENDLE backâ is technically impossible. The only way to preserve the value of these locked assets is to wrap them in a new model (DAT/OSTR) that can continue to generate yield.
4. Survival > Stagnation If we reject this, we deadlock. The protocol stagnates, the community fractures, and the value of our âwrapperâ tokens likely bleeds to zero while we wait for a liquidation that canât happen for years. PIP #22 offers a path to survival and growth. The mNAV model gives OSTR a chance to capture value beyond just the underlying PENDLE price.
Conclusion We are facing a tough market situation, but PIP #22 offers liquidity, a treasury subsidy, and a future roadmap. The alternative is a slow, fee-heavy wind-down or a legal battle over a contract that explicitly said âirreversible.â
Letâs take the deal that keeps the protocol alive and gives us liquid assets. Iâm voting YES.
PNP treasury tokens canât be treated as though they are an external asset being donated. They are PART of the contested capital structure, and the claim on underlying value is what we are trying to define.
mPENDLE holders arenât asking for a âbail inâ, theyâre asking for the assets to be priced appropriately in the first place. You canât âsubsidizeâ with an instrument that was just repriced using value that is precisely what is in dispute in the first place.
It is only your opinion that the conversion rate would be strictly based on the mPENDLE in the treasury as well btw. You canât use a contested ownership assumption to prove fairness.
I think we have a very long way to go on this stillâŠ
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I support for the merger and the DAT idea shared by Chester, but questions on mNAV Tax volatility
Iâve gone through the proposal and the conversion math, and overall, I am voting YES.
The consolidation of PNP and mPENDLE into OSTR is the correct path forward. The current liquidity fragmentation is inefficient, and the ârigid complementary assetâ thesis for the conversion rates seems fair given the current market structure. Eliminating the arbitrage gap between the two assets is necessary for the long-term health of the protocol.
However, I do have one specific area of concern regarding Section II: Revenue Distribution & mNAV Tax.
While I understand the mechanismâusing a high tax (up to 70%) when the token trades below book value (mNAV < 0.3) to force buybacksâI am worried about the predictability for the average staker.
If the market takes a downturn and we hit that <0.3 mNAV range, the yield for stakers will effectively drop off a cliff because the protocol is absorbing 70% of the revenue for buybacks. While this is mathematically healthy for the protocol (it defends the price), it might cause âyield shockâ for retail users who arenât constantly checking the mNAV ratio.
My suggestion/question to the team: Can we commit to building a very clear âmNAV Dashboardâ or a âYield Forecastâ UI before this goes live? Users need to clearly see current Tax vs. projected Tax. If the community understands that âLow Yield = Protocol is Buying Back (Defending Price),â they wonât panic unstake. But if the yield just drops without clear communication, it could cause a death spiral.
That said, the roadmap looks solid and the 2026 Q1 timeline is realistic. Letâs get the liquidity unified.
Full support from my side.
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I see your point about the capital structure, but I think you are blurring the line between Protocol Equity (PNP) and Deposit Receipts (mPENDLE).
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The âSubsidyâ is Real: The Treasury holds distinct assets: ~2.6M mPENDLE and ~2.2M PNP. Technically, the protocol could have voted to burn that treasury PNP or distribute it solely to existing PNP stakers. By choosing to take that 1.1M PNP (which has a distinct market value and governance power) and allocate it to the mPENDLE pool, the protocol IS transferring value from the âGovernance/Equityâ side to the âDepositorâ side.
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The Ownership Reality: You say âmPENDLE holders arenât asking for a bail-in⊠they are asking for assets to be priced appropriately.â But vePENDLE belongs to the Protocol, not directly to the mPENDLE holders. mPENDLE is the receipt/wrapper. Because the underlying asset (vePENDLE) is illiquid and locked, its âappropriate priceâ is not 1:1. It is the Net Asset Value (NAV) of the protocol divided by the supply. The proposal attempts to maximize this NAV by including the PNP treasury assets in the calculation. If we exclude the PNP value (as you suggest itâs âcontestedâ), the mPENDLE backing ratio drops significantly.
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The Alternative is Deadlock: If we refuse to recognize PNP as a valid asset for compensation, we are left with a math equation that doesnât balance. The âcontested capital structureâ debate is philosophical. The solvency reality is practical. We are getting a deal where the Governance Token (Equity) is diluting itself to make the Depositor Token (Debt) whole. That is the definition of a bail-in/subsidy.
Why are we not considering something similar to the EQB proposal?
I think these are two very good options. vePENDLE is no more and having a wrapped sPENDLE makes no sense as it does not provide any additional leverage given how flexible and composable sPENDLE is.
Penpie should do the right thing and make the hard decision to wind down the protocol instead of trying to lock assets that no longer provide additional value just so the team can continue to milk fees into perpetuity. Building a GameFi product is a TERRIBLE idea! Have you seen any games in web3 succeed? That is a complete waste of money.
ePendle is now trading 15% higher vs mPENDLE showing that the market values their proposal more than the current Penpie one.
Merging both into single token looks good
Hopefully this solution benefit magpie dao.
mPENDLE holders were never promised ownership of the entire PENDLE treasury. The role of mPENDLE was to capture protocol revenue flow, and it fulfilled that role very effectively through sustained yield distributions, boosts, and multiple rush campaigns over time. That value has already been realized by holders.
Asking to distribute all treasury PENDLE now is effectively double-counting past rewards while ignoring the treasuryâs function as protocol-owned capital. The OSTR proposal explicitly keeps PENDLE in the treasury to maintain Penpieâs power, support sPENDLE growth, and enable long-term revenue generation â without which Penpie cannot function as a protocol.
The OSTR transition does not remove value; it restructures it in a sustainable way. Through controlled liquidity migration, OSTR buybacks funded by mNAV-based taxes, and a clear separation between staking (sOSTR) and governance commitment (vlOSTR), the proposal aligns incentives around long-term protocol health rather than short-term extraction.
Preserving the PENDLE treasury while introducing OSTR ensures Penpie can continue to grow, defend its market position, and generate future value for all participants. This is an evolution of the system â not a redistribution event â and itâs the only path that keeps Penpie alive and productive going forward.
Recommend setting a clear deadline for the conversion of mPENDLE and PNP into OSTR. Establishing a firm timeframe will accelerate the protocolâs transition and ensure all stakeholders are aligned with the new strategic direction as quickly as possible. After all, vependle will not exist after 2 years.
Agreed with this ! That is also most protocols do when facing token conversion.
Penpie evolving into the Onchain Strategy (OSTR) is an absolute giga-brain move.
Weâve already seen whatâs possible when a treasury-first, conviction-driven model is executed properly, and Strategy is living proof that turning an asset into a long-term balance sheet weapon can completely rewrite the game. Bringing that same mindset onchain, native to DeFi, composable, and yield-aware, is pure elevation. OSTR is about structural resilience, consolidating value, and letting time and math do the violence. Penpie stepping into this role is the right way to do it: disciplined and built to compound.
Read through PIP #22 and Iâm positive on it. The OSTR merge looks like a proper attempt to fix the PNP/mPENDLE mismatch instead of letting it linger forever. Treasury backing + mNAV-based incentives feels more thought-out than most governance proposals we see.
Only real downside for me is how heavy the proposal is lots of moving parts, and retail users might glaze over. Would love a simpler breakdown.
But from a long-term protocol health perspective, this seems like the right kind of uncomfortable change. Pendle moved the goalposts, Penpie doing their best to adapt⊠Yes for me
We all clicked agreed itâs âIrreversibleâ when we converted. The underlying vePENDLE is time-locked on-chain and cannot be liquidated for full value right now. Demanding a 1:1 redemption is fantasy. The OSTR pivot is the only realistic way to preserve value and keep the protocol alive. Letâs stop arguing about things that canât happen and support the new plan that actually saves the ship.
Iâm a community user holding both PNP and mPENDLE, and Iâm ready for this change. CNY is coming, and for me this is the right timing to turn the page with a stronger mindset. In our culture we respect long-term building, patience, and discipline, and OSTR feels aligned with that energy. As a holder, I care about resilience and compounding over time. OSTR gives a clear framework to consolidate value and keep improving the system step by step. Iâm confident the team will continue to excel, and Iâm staying aligned with the mission.
Happy CNY to the community, wishing everyone health and wealth.
I support PIP #22 because it is the only path that offers immediate liquidity and a tangible treasury subsidy, rather than the impossible fantasy of âunlimited buybacksâ that the protocol cannot fund. Unlike the Equilibria proposal, which forces users into a 2-year permanent lockup just to exit , PIP #22 provides OSTR tokens immediately, giving us the freedom to trade or hold on Day 1. Furthermore, the deal actively benefits us: the treasury is giving up 1.1 million PNP specifically to boost the mPENDLE allocation, effectively diluting the governance side to support depositors. I am voting for the option that keeps the protocol alive and puts liquid assets in my wallet now.
I ay YES. Not because itâs perfect, but because the current PNP/mPENDLE setup clearly isnât optimal and this is a real attempt to fix it rather than patch around it.
What I like most is that the treasury is actually being put to work here ETH, PENDLE, liquidity instead of just sitting idle while token mechanics drift. That matters more to me than theoretical elegance.
Is it complicated? Sure. But meaningful restructures usually are. The alternative is staying stuck with misaligned incentives.
From a long-term holder perspective this has been thrust upon us by Pendle. Yes from me.