Penpie incident Overview and Request for Compensation Suggestions

Penpie 3. Community Ideas
24

Penpie Recovery Plan

This is the recovery plan I drafted based on discussions and ideas from the TG Chinese community. The docs link:

It is quite lengthy, so here is the TL;DR version:

1. What Happens to LP (Liquidity Providers)

  • Compensation through SAFUPIE: LPs who suffered asset losses in the hack will receive compensation in the form of credits (SFC). These credits can be used to receive SFP tokens or be sold on the market.
  • Claim Process: LPs can apply for compensation from the compensation treasury, with the amount calculated based on the ratio of treasury funds to remaining debt. For example, if the treasury holds 10% of the remaining debt, a claim for $10,000 in credits will yield $1,000 in tokens.
  • Ongoing Revenue Allocation: A portion of the ongoing revenue from participating SubDAOs will be allocated to replenish the compensation treasury, ensuring continuous support for LP claims.

2. What Happens to PNP and mPendle

  • Restructuring for Profitability: The plan emphasizes restructuring Penpie's revenue model to focus on profitability rather than maintaining the mPendle peg and PNP token price. The goal is to minimize the impact of the exploit by optimizing vePendle revenue utilization.
  • Shift in Revenue Allocation and vePendle Growth: A significant focus will be on increasing the protocol’s vePendle holdings, which will enhance its voting power and profitability. This increase in vePendle will directly benefit PNP holders by boosting the intrinsic value of mPendle, leading to higher rewards and long-term growth potential for the protocol.
  • Debt Transfer: Since Penpie has transferred its debt to SAFUPIE, it is automatically enrolled in the insurance plan, and 10% of its revenue will be used to fulfill compensation obligations.

3. What Happens to MGP or vlMGP

  • Change in Reward Structure: The reward structure for vlMGP will change, replacing some rewards with SFP tokens instead of PNP. After the debt transfer, Penpie's revenue will no longer contribute to vlMGP rewards.
  • SFP as Compensation: Magpie's contributions to the SFP compensation fund will earn credits that can be converted into SFP tokens, which will then be distributed to vlMGP holders.
  • Long-Term Incentives: As all tokens circulate and debts are managed, any additional revenue generated will continue to fund vlMGP rewards indirectly, through SFP and ongoing growth of protocol revenue.

Recovery Plan Details - English

1.0 Creation of SAFUPIE:

This proposal suggests that the Magpie team create a new entity, SAFUPIE. The role of this SubDAO will be similar to that of an insurance fund, with its primary goal being to accumulate revenue most of the time. In the event of an emergency, such as a hacking incident like the recent one, the SubDAO will use its funds to help repay its debts or transfer those debts.

SAFUPIE Mechanism and IDO Token Issuance:

  • Token Name: SFP
    Total Token Supply: 10 million
    Token Issuance Method: Burn SFC credits, deposit funds into the operational/compensation treasury.
    The debt amount is $30 million; for every $3 of debt eliminated or capital deposited, 1 SFP will be issued.

  • Credit Name: SFC (Safu Credits)
    Total Credit Issuance: $30 million in credits (approximately $27 million in Penpie debt transfer + less than $3 million for operational and audit costs)
    Credit Issuance Method:

    • Around $27 million will be airdropped to users based on the losses from the hacking incident.
    • The remaining credits will be airdropped to SAFUPIE for operational use, establishing initial credit liquidity.
    • Further details will be explained later.

  • In the future, 5% of the IDO funds from SubDAOs will be automatically allocated to participate in the insurance plan provided by SFP, and a continuous contribution of 3% (tentative) of protocol revenue will be required.

  • Existing SubDAOs (excluding Penpie) will decide through community voting whether to participate in this insurance plan. If they choose to participate, they must also begin and continue contributing 3% of their protocol revenue.

  • As for Penpie, since it has already transferred its debts to SAFUPIE and is the SubDAO that initiated this insurance plan, a different approach is needed. Further details will be provided in the following sections.

  • Any legal entity, organization, or individual may voluntarily participate in the credit sale.

  • Credit holders can, at any time:

    • Burn the held credits and receive a proportional amount of SFP tokens accordingly. Participating SubDAOs can choose to use these tokens for governance purposes.
    • Sell the credits on the liquidity market.
    • Apply for compensation from the compensation treasury. The compensation will be calculated based on the ratio of the treasury’s funds to the remaining debt (excluding governance credits).

For example, if the compensation treasury holds tokens valued at $2.7 million and the remaining credit amount is $27 million:
$2.7 million / $27 million = 0.1

When a user applies for compensation of $10,000 in credits, they will receive compensation in tokens valued at $10,000 x 0.1 = $1,000.
At the same time, $10,000 worth of credits will be burned, leaving the treasury with tokens valued at $2,699,000 and 26.99 million credits remaining.

  • Only SubDAOs that participate in the SFP insurance plan are eligible for debt transfer, provided that the debt transfer proposal is approved through SFP governance voting.

SFP Tokenomics:

  • Initial liquidity will be provided by the Penpie or Magpie treasury to create a pool on PancakeSwap and launch Cakepie. The Magpie team will allocate 2 million $MGP from the Magpie team allocation to be periodically deposited into Cakepie to provide bribes for the pool, ensuring continuous acquisition of $Cake emissions. As long as the bribing efficiency remains above 1.0, the deposited funds will be maximized for profitability. The pool can also benefit from veCake’s boosted rewards, with a focus on maximizing pool returns.
  • 3% of the assets contributed by each DAO will be allocated as follows: 70% to the compensation treasury and 30% to the governance/operational treasury.
  • Approximately $27 million worth of credits can be compensated through the compensation treasury based on the ratio of the treasury’s value to the remaining debt (excluding governance credits). The remaining governance credits, totaling less than $3 million, can only be withdrawn from the governance treasury on a 1:1 basis to fund project operations.
  • For every $3 contributed to the treasury by a participating SubDAO, or for every $3 in credits burned, 1 SFP token will be issued. The SubDAO community can decide whether to airdrop the acquired tokens to users or lock them up to gain governance power and rewards.
  • SFP governance rights will determine whether a protocol is eligible for the opportunity of SFP debt transfer.
  • If all tokens are in circulation and no new debt arises, any revenue generated will continue to be added to the compensation fund proportionally.
  • If all tokens are in circulation and new debt arises, no new SFP tokens will be minted; instead, new credits will be issued and directly airdropped to the affected parties.

SFP Compensation Fund:

  • 70% of the revenue contributed by each SubDAO will be allocated to the compensation fund, while 30% will be allocated to the operational fund.
  • The operational treasury’s funds will primarily be used to establish liquidity, support operations, and provide staking rewards for the SFP lock-up pool (vlSFP).
  • The maximum amount available for operational use is approximately $3 million (reflecting the initial issuance of less than $3 million in credits).
  • Without affecting operations, the majority of the operational treasury will be allocated to the lock-up pool as staking rewards.
  • In the compensation fund, 50% (adjustable) of the funds will be used for staking (e.g., Pendle/BTC) to generate returns, while the other 50% (adjustable) will be kept in the compensation treasury to handle potential claims.
  • The compensation treasury will primarily hold assets such as BTC, ETH, and USD, as mainstream assets provide more secured value compared to altcoins (representing about 70% of the project’s holdings).
  • The operational treasury, on the other hand, will mainly hold altcoins to generate sufficient returns for SFP and sustain the project’s operations (representing about 30% of the project’s holdings).
  • Once the $27 million in credits is fully resolved, the compensation fund will merge with the operational treasury, and the principal will continue to accumulate. At that point, vlSFP will be entitled to receive 100% of the project’s interest income.
  • If a new compensation event occurs, 70% of the mainstream assets will be reallocated to reestablish the compensation fund to address the new debt issues.

Credit Liquidity Pool:

  • At the initial stage of the project, 250,000 credits from the initial issuance will be allocated, along with 125,000 USDT/USDC provided by the Magpie/Penpie treasury, to establish a credit pool with a 1:0.5 USD, such as an SFC-USDT pool.

Compensation Method:

  • Credit holders can at any time:
    • Burn the credits they hold to receive a proportional amount of SFP tokens. Participating SubDAOs can choose to use these tokens for governance purposes.
    • Sell the credits on the liquidity market.
    • Apply for compensation from the compensation treasury, which will be provided based on the ratio of the treasury’s funds to the remaining debt (excluding governance credits).

For example: If the compensation treasury holds tokens valued at $2.7 million and the remaining credits amount to $27 million:
$2.7 million / $27 million = 0.1

When a user applies for compensation of $10,000 in credits, they will receive tokens valued at $10,000 x 0.1 = $1,000. At the same time, $10,000 worth of credits will be burned. After this transaction, the treasury will have a remaining value of $2,699,000, and the remaining credit amount will be 26.99 million.

$SFP Utilities:

  • The Magpie MegaDAO ecosystem will provide a significant advantage, and effectively utilizing it can offer more use cases for $SFP beyond just staking rewards, helping to stabilize its price.
  • One potential utility is to allow vlSFP to become a shared Boost Multiplier in each SubDAO’s Rush activities. Typically, only the SubDAO’s own locked tokens, such as vlPNP, can be used as a Boost Multiplier in Rush activities. We could make vlSFP an alternative Boost Multiplier alongside the SubDAO’s tokens.
  • Another utility could be allowing $SFP to be burned for more IDO allocations, similar to $MGP. However, these allocations should not be taken from the $MGP allocation but rather should be a separate, distinct allocation that is smaller than that of $MGP, to avoid causing dissatisfaction among $MGP holders.

2.0 Changes to the vlMGP Reward Structure:

The current vlMGP reward structure consists of $PNP, $RDP, and $CKP. The condition for revenue sharing from a SubDAO should be that the SubDAO’s operations are profitable. After this incident, Penpie’s operations are running at a loss, and with the debt transferred to Safupie, the associated revenue should no longer be shared but instead be redirected to the SFP compensation fund.

Similarly, whenever Magpie deposits this revenue into the SFP compensation fund, it will receive corresponding credits, which can then be burned to obtain $SFP tokens that are distributed to vlMGP holders. This means that the new reward structure will consist of $SFP, $RDP, and $CKP.

3.0 Overall Changes to Penpie:

After the incident, the community’s primary concern is the future direction of Penpie and whether compensation efforts will reduce the direct benefits of mPendle and PNP. The main purpose of establishing Safupie is to minimize the impact of the exploited protocol as much as possible. Although the debt has been transferred, a restructuring of the revenue model is still inevitable.

The focus of the restructuring should be on enhancing profitability, rather than primarily catering to users’ demands for maintaining the mPendle peg and the PNP token price, as was done before.

Note: Since the debt transfer, Penpie has been automatically enrolled in the Safupie insurance plan.

Current Overall Revenue of Penpie

  • The entire revenue of the Penpie protocol is determined by the vePendle controlled by the protocol, and the vePendle revenue consists of the following parts:
    • Guide pools to receive Pendle emissions for LP through voting.
    • Obtain a 3% base reward to repurchase PNP for bribes.
    • Obtain 80% of the swap fees from the voted pools through voting; 50% of these fees are used to buyback mPendle and add to the pool, while the other 50% is used to buyback PNP and distribute it as a voter reward.
    • Boost the rewards earned by LPs on the Penpie platform. The Penpie protocol will take a 22% cut from the boosted rewards as a fee. The detailed distribution is shown in the diagram below:

Proposed vePendle Revenue Distribution:

  • Based on the records from May to August, the average monthly vePendle revenue over these four months was 179.5 ETH (including base rewards and voter rewards). The majority of this revenue was used for buyback mPendle and PNP; however, these simple buybacks do not generate additional income for the protocol, as the core income driver, vePendle, does not increase through buyback.
  • Firstly, let’s list the areas where the revenue can be effectively utilized:
    • Directly locked as vePendle without minting new mPendle: This continuously increases the vePendle holdings and profitability, enhances the intrinsic value of mPendle, and continuously boosts the voting power and rewards for vlPNP.
    • Deposit into the SFP compensation fund and receive $SFP tokens: This is an obligation as part of the Safupie insurance plan. However, the received $SFP can be used as stake rewards or for bribes in the mPendle LP pool, depending on whether the bribing efficiency is greater than 1.0.
    • Purchase and burn credit tokens from the credit liquidity pool to obtain $SFP tokens: This is an obligation for debt transfer. If the credit price is less than 0.95, more credit tokens will be purchased from the pool to obtain more $SFP. Similarly, the acquired $SFP can be used as stake rewards or for bribes in the mPendle LP pool. If the credit price is greater than 0.95, the funds are directly deposited into the SFP compensation fund.
    • Serve as a lock-up reward for mPendle SV: The reward is distributed by buyback PNP, tying mPendle’s value to vePendle’s revenue. Therefore, continuously increasing vePendle will also increase the SV pool’s returns over time.
    • Distributed as voter rewards to vlPNP: The reward is distributed by buyback PNP. As vePendle continues to increase, vlPNP’s voting power will also grow, thereby indirectly boosting voter rewards.
  • Next is the distribution ratio:
    • Directly lock as vePendle without minting new mPendle: 50%
    • Deposit into the SFP compensation fund and receive $SFP tokens: 3%
    • Purchase and burn credit tokens from the credit liquidity pool to obtain $SFP tokens: 7%
    • Serve as a lock-up reward for mPendle SV: 15%
    • Distributed as voter rewards to vlPNP: 25%

Taking August’s vePendle revenue as an example:

  • Voter Revenue: 60 ETH (50% for buyback mPendle, 50% for repurchasing PNP to be distributed as voter rewards)
  • Base Revenue: 151 ETH (used for buyback PNP for bribes)

So, the revenue for vlPNP in August (excluding bribes) is actually 60 ETH * 0.5 = 30 ETH.

However, under the new distribution rules, vlPNP will receive (60 + 151) * 0.25 = 52.75 ETH.

Therefore, the new distribution method will not reduce the benefits for vlPNP. Moreover, the new distribution method will continuously increase the protocol’s vePendle holdings each month, thereby enhancing the intrinsic value of mPendle and the voting power of vlPNP, while also steadily increasing vePendle revenue.

Proposed LP Boosted Rewards Distribution:

  • Restore the 20% fee as one of the strategies to re-attract LPs after the incident.
  • New boosted rewards distribution:

**Penpie 復蘇計劃書**

## 1. 創建SAFUPIE：

此計劃書提議由Magpie團隊另外創建SAFUPIE。此SubDAO的作用將類似於保險，多數時間將以纍積收益為第一目標，在SubDAO有需要時（如此次被盜事件），則將把資金用來幫助償還SubDAO的債務，或把債務轉移。

1.1. SAFUPIE機制與IDO代幣發行：

  • 代幣名稱：SFP
    • 代幣總量：1000萬
    • 代幣發行方式：
      • 銷毀SFC債權，注資營運/賠償基金。
      • 債權3000萬美元，每協助消除/注資3美元的債權將派發1 $SFP
  • 債權名稱：SFC （Safu Credits）
    • 發行總量：3000萬美元債權
      • 約2700萬Penpie債務轉移 + 不到300萬營運和審計費用
    • 債權發行方式：
      • 2700多萬按駭客事件損失金額空投給用戶。
      • 剩餘債權空投給SUFAPIE 用於營運，建立債權初始流動性。詳細細節見 #1.4。
  • 未來SubDAO的IDO資金將有5%（暫定）用作自動參與SFP提供的保險計劃，並持續貢獻3%（暫定）的協議收益。
  • 現有的SubDAO（不含Penpie）將由各自的社區投票參不參與此保險計劃。若參與，也必須開始並持續貢獻3%的協議收益。
  • Penpie：則由於已將債務轉移至SAFUPIE，也因爲是催生此保險計劃的SubDAO，處理方式不宜相同，將在後面章節給予詳細説明。
  • 各法人、機構或個人可以自願參與到債權銷售。
  • 債權持有人可在任何時候：
    • 銷毀持有的債權，並按照份額獲得相應比例的SFP代幣，參與的SubDAO可選擇將這些代幣用於治理代幣用途。
    • 於流動性市場販售債權。
    • 向賠償基金申請賠償，按賠償基金/剩餘債務(不包含治理債權)比例獲得賠償。
      • 例如: 假設賠償基金擁有價值270萬美元代幣，債權幣剩餘2700萬美元
        （270萬/2700萬 = 0.1）。
        • 當用戶申請1萬美元債權申請賠償：
          • 將收到10000X0.1=1000美元價值的代幣賠償。
          • 同時銷毀1萬美元的債權，這時基金將剩餘價值為2699000元，債權代幣將剩餘2699萬顆。
  • 只有參與了SFP保險計劃的SubDAO才有獲得債務轉移的資格。前提是債務轉移提案通過SFP治理投票。

1.2. SFP代幣經濟：

  • 初始流動性將由Penpie或Magpie國庫提供，于Pancakeswap建立池子並上綫Cakepie。
  • Magpie團隊從$MGP團隊份額中提出200萬$MGP，每期注入Cakepie為該池子提供賄賂，用於為池子持續獲取$Cake排放。只要賄賂效益高於1.0，就能把注入的資金最大利益化。該池子還能獲得veCake的boost收益，務必將池子收益最大化。
  • 各DAO注資的3%資產，其中70%投入賠償基金，30%投入治理/營運基金。
    • 約2700萬的債權能透過賠償基金，按基金價值/剩餘債務(不包含治理債權)比例獲得賠償。
    • 剩餘不到300萬的治理債權則僅能按 1:1的比例於治理基金提取資金用於項目營運。
  • 參與的SubDAO每貢獻3美元進入基金，或者銷毀3美元的債權即可獲得1 $SFP代幣。
  • 所獲得的$SFP代幣，SubDAO社區可自行決定空投給用戶，或鎖倉以獲得治理權力和收益。
  • SFP的治理權力將決定參與的協議是否能獲得SFP債務轉移的機會，或其他援助方式。
  • 當代幣全部流通並無新債務，所獲得收益繼續以同比例納入賠償基金。
  • 當代幣全部流通而出現新債務，SFP代幣不增發，增發債權直接空投給受害者。

1.3. SFP賠償基金：

  • 各SubDAO貢獻的收益：70%納入基金、30%納入Safupie項目營運基金。
  • 營運基金資金主要用於建立流動性、項目團隊營運和SFP鎖倉池（vlSFP）的質押收益。
    • 其中，營運所能使用的上限約為300萬u。(最初發行不到300萬的債權)
  • 在不影響營運下，營運基金絕大部分將投入鎖倉池作爲質押收益。
  • 賠償基金裏的資金，50%(可調整)用於質押（如Pendle/BTC）獲取收益，50%(可調整)放置於賠償基金應對隨時可以能賠償申請。
  • 賠償基金主要持有BTC ETH USD相關資產 ，主流資產相對於山寨幣更有擔保的價值。 (約佔項目70%)
    營運基金則主要持有山寨幣 ，以便為SFP創造足夠的收益維持項目運轉。(約佔項目30%)
  • 當2700萬債權全數解決，賠償基金將與營運基金合併，本金將持續累積，而vlSFP將可開始獲得項目100%的利息收益。直到發生新一輪的賠償事件，則70%的主流資產將重新建立賠償基金，解決新的債務問題。

1.4. 債權流動性池子：

  • 項目啓動初期，從最初發行的債權中取出25萬債權，配合Magpie/Penpie國庫提供的12.5萬USDT/USDC，建立初始比例1:0.5美金的債權池子。如SFC-USDT。

1.5. 賠償方式：

  • 債權持有人可在任何時候：
    • 銷毀持有的債權，並按照份額獲得相應比例的SFP代幣，參與的SubDAO可選擇將這些代幣用於治理代幣用途。
    • 於流動性市場販售債權。
    • 向賠償基金申請賠償，按賠償基金/剩餘債務(不包含治理債權)比例獲得賠償。
      • 例如: 假設賠償基金擁有價值270萬美元代幣，債權幣剩餘2700萬美元
        （270萬/2700萬 = 0.1）。
        • 當用戶申請1萬美元債權申請賠償：
          • 將收到10000X0.1=1000美元價值的代幣賠償。
          • 同時銷毀1萬美元的債權，這時基金將剩餘價值為2699000元，債權代幣將剩餘2699萬顆。

1.6. $SFP應用場景：

  • Magpie MegaDAO生態將是個優勢，好好利用起來將能為$SFP提供更多除了質押收益外的應用場景，有助穩定價格。
  • 其中一個可能的應用是：讓vlSFP成爲每個SubDAO的Rush活動裏，共用的Boost Multiplier。通常來説，只有SubDAO本身的鎖倉代筆，例如vlPNP能用作Rush活動的Boost Multiplier。我們可以讓vlSFP成爲除了SubDAO代幣外的另類Boost Multiplier。
  • 還有一種就是，讓$SFP跟$MGP一樣，可以燃燒銷毀以獲得更多IDO份額。當然，該份額不應該取自MGP，而是應該另外獨立的份額，并且應該要少於MGP的份額，不然會引起MGP持有者的反感。

2. vlMGP收益結構的更改：

目前的vlMGP收益結構為$PNP、$RDP和$CKP。SubDAO收益共享的前提條件應該是建立於該SubDAO的營運是有盈利的。此次事件後，Penpie的營運是虧損的，并且在債務轉移給Safupie后，這部分收益自然不該繼續共享，而是同步轉移至SFP賠償基金。

同樣的，每當Magpie把這項收益注入SFP賠償基金，也能獲得相應的債權，并且可以銷毀債權獲得$SFP代幣，然後派發給vlMGP用戶。即是説，新的收益結構將會是$SFP，$RDP和$CKP。

3. Penpie協議 - 收益分配改動提案：

事件發生後，社群最關心的莫過於Penpie今後的路該怎麽走，賠償是否會削減mPendle和PNP的直接利益。而成立Safupie的初衷也在於盡量減少被盜協議的影響。儘管債務轉移了，可是收益結構的重組依然是在所難免。

而重組的方向，應該是致力於提高盈利能力，而非像之前那般重點迎合用戶們對mPendle peg與PNP幣價的要求。

注：從債務轉移起，Penpie就已經默認加入Safupie保險計劃。

3.1. 目前Penpie整體收益：

  • 整個Penpie協議的收益由協議控制的vependle決定，而vePendle收益由以下幾部分：
    1. 透過投票 引導池子獲得pendle排放給LP
    2. 獲得3%的base reward用來回購PNP用於賄賂
    3. 透過投票 取得所投票池80%交易費，50%用來回購mpendle加池子 50%用來回購pnp作為voter reward發放
    4. 提升(Boost) Penpie平台上LP所獲得的獎勵，Penpie協議將收取22% 的boosted reward作為抽成，詳細分配見下圖：

3.2. 提議vePendle收益分配：

3.2.1. 背景：

  • 根據5-8月的記錄，Penpie協議通過持有的vePendle平均每月獲得179.5ETH的收益 （base rewards + voter rewards）。
  • 當前Penpie的 vePendle 收益分配：
    • $mPendle 回購：50%
    • $PNP 回購：50%
  • 當前 Penpie的 vePendle 回購潛在問題：$PNP & $mPendle的回購雖然提升了Penpie生態的內循環與持有者收益，但沒有為 Penpie 協議帶來更多收入。因爲 Penpie 協議的底層收益能力（vePendle數量）并沒有因爲回購增加。

3.2.2. vePendle收益可投入的選項：

  1. [新增] 使用 $ETH，購入 $Pendle 並鎖定為 vePendle，增加Penpie協議的vePendle持有量：
  • 此過程將不會鑄造新的mPendle。
  • 此過程將提高 $mPendle 與 $vlPNP 的內在價值。（每一單位的 $mPendle 與 $vlPNP 對應更多的 $Pendle 與 vePendle）。
  1. [新增] 使用 $ETH，存入 Safupie 賠償基金並獲得$SFP代幣，實踐參與Safupie保險計畫的義務與支持Penpie事故賠償的執行。
  • 後續延伸可行性：Penpie 協議可以在未來將回購取得的$SFP代幣再利用。例如：作為Penpie mPendle LP、mPendle SV、vlPNP質押等池子的獎勵。
  1. [新增] 使用 $ETH，從債權幣流動性池子購買債權幣銷毀並獲得$SFP代幣：
  • 此爲債務轉移的義務。由於債券池子隨市場浮動，此舉能為Penpie協議獲取更多債券以換取更多$SFP。所得$SFP可以視情況用作mPendle LP池子的直接收益或賄賂。
  1. [新增] 使用 $ETH，回購＄PNP，將$PNP作爲mPendle SV的鎖倉獎勵：
  • 提高收益，並將mPendle 與 vePendle的收益關聯。
  1. [現有] 使用 $ETH，回購＄PNP，將$PNP作爲Voter收益派給vlPNP持有者

備註：vePendle收益初始狀態是$ETH。

3.2.3. 建議的vePendle收益分配比例：

  1. 直接鎖成vePendle且不鑄造新的mPendle：50%
  2. 存進SFP賠償基金並獲得$SFP代幣：3%
  3. 從債權幣流動性池子購買債權幣銷毀並獲得$SFP代幣：7%
  4. 作爲mPendle SV的鎖倉獎勵：15%
  5. 作爲Voter收益派給vlPNP：25%

3.2.4. 備註：vlPNP持有者視角：

以8月的vePendle收益爲例：

  • Voter收益：60ETH (50%回購mpendle, 50%回購PNP作為voter reward發放)
  • Base收益：151ETH (回購PNP用於賄賂)

vlPNP持有者收益（不含賄賂）：

  • 當前規則：60ETH *0.5 = 30 ETH；
  • 新分配規則下，vlPNP將獲得（60+151）*0.25 = 52.75 ETH。

所以，新分配方式并不會削減vlPNP的利益。再説，新分配方式還每月持續增持Penpie協議的vePendle存量來增加mPendle的内在價值和vlPNP的投票效力。

3.3. 提議LP Boosted rewards分配：

  • 恢復20%抽成，以作爲事件後重新吸引LP的策略之一。
  • 新的boosted rewards分配：
    image
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