# Evaluating Strategic Paths Forward
**URL:** https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756
**Category:** 3. Community Ideas
**Created:** [January 20, 2026, 2:23am UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756 "2026-01-20T02:23:39Z")
**Posts on this page:** 20
**Page:** 1
### Author:  [@Lego](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/Lego)
#### Post date: [January 20, 2026, 2:23am UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/1 "2026-01-20T02:23:39Z")
This forum discussion opens a structured governance process following recent changes to the Pendle protocol. Penpie is entering a transition period and will work with the community to evaluate the most resilient path forward. The purpose of this thread is to gather feedback, questions, and alternative proposals to inform that evaluation, ensuring decisions are made with full context and transparency. Once the discussion phase concludes and a leading direction is clear, the next steps will be formalized and submitted to a community vote.
Reference: [https://x.com/pendle\_fi/status/2013431342546157825?s=20](https://x.com/pendle_fi/status/2013431342546157825?s=20)
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### Author:  [@Dayronpro](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/Dayronpro)
#### Post date: [January 20, 2026, 3:07am UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/2 "2026-01-20T03:07:32Z")
Pendle’s Tweet That Puts Magpie and Penpie on the Ropes"
“content”: "Look, what Pendle announced in that tweet – essentially a native “lock-and-liquify” for PENDLE that the Pendle team itself calls xPENDLE – radically changes the game. In two sentences: from now on, anyone can lock PENDLE within the official app, receive a liquid token representing vePENDLE in return, continue collecting vePENDLE fees, and, if they want, sell or use that token as collateral without going through a third party.
First, let’s understand where the money was coming from. Until yesterday, the easiest route for a retail user who wanted yield from vePENDLE was to give their PENDLE to Penpie. Penpie locks them for two years, generates vePENDLE, collects the Pendle fees, and, on top of that, keeps a percentage of the tips – the bribes, which are incentives paid by other protocols for you to vote for their pool. Then it distributes a portion of all that in mPENDLE and PNP, its own token. The model is a carbon copy of what Convex did with Curve.
With xPENDLE, Pendle cuts out the middleman. The user locks their tokens, receives their liquid token, can vote themselves or delegate with a couple of clicks, and collects the same tips without paying the commission that Penpie was taking. This direct cut reduces the flow of PENDLE to Penpie and, by extension, to Magpie Megadao, because remember that Magpie is the parent company that groups three sub-DAOs: Magpie (veWOM), Penpie (vePENDLE), and Radpie (veRDNT). Fewer deposits mean less new vePENDLE, which in the medium term erodes the voting share that Penpie already controls; its votes are diluted epoch after epoch while the total vePENDLE pie continues to grow thanks to Pendle itself.
Yes, Penpie keeps the vePENDLE it has already accumulated – about forty-three million units according to the official dashboards – but the compounding advantage disappears. Until today, Penpie was adding around seven or eight million PENDLE tokens locked per quarter, a pace that allowed it to maintain its position at around twenty percent of the vote. If new deposits slow down because people prefer xPENDLE, those locks stagnate while the weekly PENDLE inflation continues and competitors gain ground. The result: less voting power, fewer bribes allocated, less revenue to distribute, and therefore less incentive to deposit… a classic vicious cycle.
And what about Magpie as a holding company? Its pitch to investors was to become the great cross-chain aggregator of veTokens: you deposit pure tokens, and they return liquid tokens that yield more because they pool critical mass, maximize the “boost,” and centralize bribe trading. Pendle’s move demonstrates that base protocols won’t always tolerate a third party capturing value indefinitely. With Wombat, there was never a native competitor, nor with Radiant, but Pendle has just shown the way. This disrupts the “mega-DAO” narrative and complicates raising new capital.
However, this is not the end of Penpie, only the end of Penpie 2.0, which thrived on being a simple locker. The path to reinvention involves three approaches. First, offering packaged strategies that the native protocol won’t provide: automatic looping of PT against lending markets, YT collars to protect rates, and vaults that combine Pendle with the new restaking points. Second, becoming the neutral bribe marketplace that aggregates and auctions votes not only from vePENDLE but also from veWOM, veRDNT, and any other veToken; it’s more convenient for issuing projects to bribe on a single front-end than on five. And third, tokenizing its own fee stream—an on-chain bond backed by historical cash flow—and using it as collateral. This would give PNP real utility beyond the governance function that almost no one values today.
There’s some political timing involved here. Pendle keeps sixty percent of the trading fees and distributes eighty percent of that to the lockers. With the emergence of xPENDLE, that revenue stream goes directly to the end user’s pocket. If Penpie wants to continue capturing value, it must offer an extra yield that compensates for its commission. This could be achieved by combining bribes from multiple protocols, front-running yield via flash loans, or, most obviously, negotiating an additional revenue share with Pendle in exchange for continuing to distribute institutional incentives.
Is this possible? Yes, but it requires moving quickly. The Penpie contract needs a version three that accepts xPENDLE as collateral and allows for seamless migration: you deposit PENDLE, and Penpie decides on your behalf whether it’s more advantageous to lock it in vePENDLE or use xPENDLE as collateral in Morpho to leverage PT loops. If they manage to abstract this logic, the user only has to press a single button again, and the convenience advantage reappears. Follow the money: in the age of points and airdrops, the most lucrative asset isn’t the veToken, but the deployed liquidity units that generate double or triple rewards. Penpie can position itself right there, making it easier for farming funds to enter with leverage without having to understand every new LRT or every new restaker. This requires spending on development, yes, but it also opens up performance and origination fees that Pendle, as a neutral protocol, won’t pursue because it would dilute its “infrastructure” proposition.
In short: Pendle’s tweet doesn’t kill Penpie, but it cuts off its easy growth path and forces it to change its model. It takes away Magpie Megadao’s calling card of “we are the dominant vePENDLE accumulator” and demands that it prove it can be more than just a collective locker. The next logical step is for Penpie to declare itself a “strategies layer” on top of Pendle, launch vaults with managed risk, and become a multi-chain bribe broker. If they delay in doing so, xPENDLE and any other native locker that Pendle launches afterward—there’s already talk of rlPENDLE for restaking—will steal their deposits and, with them, the traction of their PNP token.
This is my interpretation of the situation. Pendle keeps the easy part of the business; Penpie has to move up a step in the value chain or accept that its days of printing money with a simple mToken are over.
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### Author:  [@Bharath](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/Bharath)
#### Post date: [January 20, 2026, 7:44am UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/3 "2026-01-20T07:44:53Z")
The proposal is great. I love this proposal.
As per pendle announcement, the sPendle conversion will be upto 4X according to our lock period.
So, the pendle holders will benefit. But there are two tokens mPendle and PNP. How the revenue be divided?. It will be good, when there is only one token.
Also what is the future for MGP Holders?? MGP solely depends on PNP.
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### Author:  [@greenBerg](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/greenBerg)
#### Post date: [January 21, 2026, 1:33pm UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/4 "2026-01-21T13:33:25Z")
No more bribes for PNP and no hight yield for mPENDLE anymore.
It does not make sense having 2 different tokens going forward.
I would propose a merge of the token on a fair ratio.
Going forward Penpie can become a DAT. Meaning its aim is to increase Pendle per token through staking and defi and buybacks when mNAV is below 0.9 for example.
The new DAT (digital asset treasury) is always active so no worry to miss emissions. The DAT monitors the pendle ecosystem and can take advantage if any opportunities opens up. I am very positive for pendle and the DAT will benefit from a price appreciations of pendle.
I am sure there are even more reasons I havent come up with to choose a DAT over a direct token investment.
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### Author:  [@UnderwaterHolder](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/UnderwaterHolder)
#### Post date: [January 21, 2026, 5:37pm UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/5 "2026-01-21T17:37:55Z")
Pendle move’s make sense
Penpie & Equilibria were taking business away from Pendle - with this move, they’ll be able to accrue to themselves or sPendle the flow of Pendle which went to Penpie & Equilibria’s treasuries ;
Cutting the middleman.
I think :
We should allow redeeming in 2 years, and PNP holders get all the mPendle in the treasury, and 50% rights to the yield.
We then sunset PNP, with mPendle being the only token left.
We can update things if the situation & revenue improves, but just making a promise of allowing redemption 1:1 or 1:0.90 would give back trust.
mPendle was a way to earn liquid yield on Pendle. Not an investment in a tolen who would dump 50% from peg or only give you back 50% if or when redemption happens
Looking forward to see the proposed plan so we can actually discuss on what’s planned.
But ideas of becoming a DAT when there’s no added value to new mPendle lockers, and very little added mPendle stakers outside Penpie rushes seem unrealistic
PS : Would be good if we don’t have AI posted messages like the one above by dayronpro
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### Author:  [@rooivalk](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/rooivalk)
#### Post date: [January 21, 2026, 5:40pm UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/6 "2026-01-21T17:40:00Z")
With bribes gone, and emissions being directed algorithmically, there is little use for liquid lockers anymore (as everyone gets the same yield now).
I suggest sunsetting the lockers and returning mPendle (as Pendle) to holders after 2 years (when the final vePendle retires). There is no use for a liquid locker anymore as it is just the same as sPendle once the two-year boost from vePendle expires. Doing anything else would just be holding the staked Pendle hostage (which by the way, is trading at a significant discount to par value).
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### Author:  [@rooivalk](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/rooivalk)
#### Post date: [January 21, 2026, 5:42pm UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/7 "2026-01-21T17:42:14Z")
I agreee with UnderwaterHolder. We should allow redeeming in 2 years once the boost expires and there is little use for a liquid wrapped staked token.
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### Author:  [@pocketq](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/pocketq)
#### Post date: [January 22, 2026, 2:46am UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/8 "2026-01-22T02:46:46Z")
I don’t believe PNP would allow redemption of PENDLE, as its purpose is to improve PNP rather than dissolve it. Reputation is also important, of course. What’s changing here isn’t the commitment or effort toward mPENDLE, but rather the utility of the PNP token. Therefore, at the very least, I believe we must guarantee that when the sPENDLE announcement was made on January 20, the price floor should ensure 1 mPENDLE \> 0.58 PENDLE. After all, we still have a 4x window period. Let’s take this opportunity to resolve the conflict between mPENDLE and PNP once and for all—there’s no need to keep pushing two separate tokens.
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### Author:  [@UnderwaterHolder](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/UnderwaterHolder)
#### Post date: [January 22, 2026, 2:10pm UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/9 "2026-01-22T14:10:43Z")
0.58 is absolutely ridiculous.
For multiple reasons.
1. According to the current proposal, PNP holders would receive more OSTR than mPendle holders.
That’s insane.
PNP as always been more of a YT play, while mPendle was just liquid staking.
2. We’ll have effectively a new peg from conversion of OSTR, based around the value of Pendle, under the expectation that OSTR will be redeemed after 2 years.
It will also go even lower due to the lockup discount. So effectively the 0.6 we get will end up at 0.4.
3. Voting the merge is rewriting ownership of assets.
It’s plain expropriation.
4. This whole plan is holding mPendle tokens hostage to extract as much value as possible from it. And once the merge will be complete, mPendle holders won’t have the sole claim to the vePendle, and in 2 years the current PNP holders will ask to redeem, because there simply isn’t any business avenue left for Penpie.
_It’d be better to keep both tokens separated and put a 10-20% tax on redemption which would go to PNP holders than merging. But PNP having the whole decision making power, will vote for merging, since irrespective of the terms, it’s more advantageous for them, because they effectively swap expired YT tokens for PT / SY tokens. And they take more than 50% of it. It’s insane._
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### Author:  [@UnderwaterHolder](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/UnderwaterHolder)
#### Post date: [January 22, 2026, 2:24pm UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/10 "2026-01-22T14:24:26Z")
For reference, here’s the current proposal, in Chinese : [Penpie - Google Docs](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1K5bI3bXtK8Dy_svTBeeSB0nnYVLkn7HuLBoiDQHId5k/edit?usp=drivesdk)
mPendle stakers agreed to stake under the original terms.
vePendle max rewards takes 2 years lockup.
Lock with us, get rewards, stay liquid.
Ok.
Now vePendle is no more, we have sPendle, lockup for 14 days.
The original terms don’t apply anymore, and I personally don’t subscribe to the new terms.
Therefore why would mPendle holders be coerced in subsidizing Penpie ?
**After the 2 years of lockup, mPendle subsidize PNP through :**
- Perptual lock up beyond the original contracted 2 years
- Destruction of peg
- We will 100% subsidize the PRT payments due to the hack.
- We also subsidize MGP revenue.
- No added benefits vs naked vePendle after 2 years
- No extra revenue - actually lower revenue since the mPendle revenue now gets split to PNP, PRT & MGP, which before PNP was mostly getting voting revenue.
Since now there (supposedly) won’t even be any voting revenue, effectively for PNP, MGP, PRT to be paid, we need to take revenue out of staking rewards of mPendle, or mPendle itself as currently planned.
We can’t even vote on this situation.
Voting is not about choosing how to be expropriate mPendle holders.
PNP was always more of a YT play while mPendle was a PT play.
The currently proposed solution effectively takes the guaranteed rate (underlying asset) of PT to YT expired tokens.
**Once the merge will be complete, mPendle holders won’t have the sole claim to the vePendle, and in 2 years the current PNP holders will ask to redeem, because there simply isn’t any business avenue left for Penpie.**
What I propose :
- OSTR split at a 0.85 conversion rate for mPendle with ability to convert at expiry.
- Pendle market is open with OSTR with expiry in 2 years, in January 2028.
- Instead of giving OSTR to users, we give PT-OSTR to mPendle holders at 0.85 peg, PT-OSTR of the rest to PNP holders -…
BUT we split YT-OSTR 50/50 between PNP holders & mPendle holders.
PNP holders get a fair split of yield, as they always were owed.
They get Pendle underlying as a matter of fairness.
But giving majority holdings of OSTR to PNP holders is ludicrous.
I’ll end on this quote : “It’s actually completely nuts that the random token (PNP) is backed by more PENDLE than the liquid wrapper itself”
PS : I believe that this forum is more for show than anything else.
The final decision has already been made among key PNP voters, whom all happen to be Chinese speaking.
mPendle holders will be expropriated without a say because OF COURSE they’d vote to get some more value of their expired YT tokens (PNP).
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### Author:  [@PimmZ](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/PimmZ)
#### Post date: [January 23, 2026, 1:14am UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/11 "2026-01-23T01:14:43Z")
The fundamental decision to convert PENDLE into mPENDLE (Magpie PENDLE) is built upon a single, clear value proposition: gaining access to vePENDLE rewards without the requirement of permanently locking one’s capital (liquid version). As a liquid wrapper, mPENDLE is specifically designed to provide flexibility.
1. A Measured Social Contract.
When a user chooses to convert to mPENDLE, they enter into a widely understood “implicit agreement.” Users recognize and accept that the protocol (PNP/Penpie) will retain a specific portion of rewards as a fee for the service of directing votes and managing bribes. As long as the underlying vePENDLE mechanism remains the engine of the protocol, this fee is viewed as a fair exchange for liquidity. However, user expectations are strictly bounded: this is an operational fee for a service, not an absolute surrender of asset ownership rights.
2. When Foundations Shift: The Right to Exit.
Ethical boundaries are crossed when the fundamental structure of the underlying asset (vePENDLE) is altered or removed. In any healthy financial system, if an investment product undergoes a “material change” to its terms and conditions, the provider is morally and professionally obligated to provide an opt-out path.
Attempting to utilize a majority voting mechanism to force users to remain in a protocol, or to withhold assets after their fundamental nature has changed, is a direct deviation from the core principles of decentralization. Governance should be a tool for collective growth, not a cage to legitimize the retention of property that was never the protocol’s to begin with.
3. Ownership vs. Asset Control.
Everywhere, there is a universal moral principle that must be upheld: the mere act of holding or receiving someone else’s assets does not grant you the freedom to use them at your own discretion.
The Case Analogy: Consider the “wrongful transfer” incident experienced by [Crypto.com](http://Crypto.com). Even though the assets were technically within the recipient’s wallet or control due to a systemic error, that party had no legal or moral right to claim those assets as their own. Possession is not always nine-tenths of the law in a system built on trust.
DeFi Relevance: This principle applies directly to protocols. Penpie acts as a custodian and a strategic manager of user capital. When the original purpose of that management ceases to exist, the assets must be returned to their rightful owners. They should not be locked away or repurposed through the use of biased governance rhetoric
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### Author:  [@PimmZ](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/PimmZ)
#### Post date: [January 23, 2026, 1:42am UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/12 "2026-01-23T01:42:24Z")
Imagine if LDO holders held a vote to seize 50% of all ETH deposited in Lido, using it to purchase other assets for the sole benefit of LDO holders. Would we call that “governance,” or would we call it theft? The answer is clear: it’s theft, because LDO is a service provider, not the owner of the depositors’ principal.
The same logic applies to mPENDLE. These protocols were built as liquid wrappers, designed specifically so users could access rewards without sacrificing their capital’s flexibility. If the underlying foundation (vePENDLE) is fundamentally altered or removed, the protocol has a moral obligation to provide an opt-out path. Using a majority vote—especially one driven by those who do not own the underlying assets—to trap or repurpose capital is a direct violation of DeFi ethics. Asset ownership is a fundamental right that cannot be overridden by governance rhetoric.
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### Author:  [@Chester\_Lin](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/Chester_Lin)
#### Post date: [January 23, 2026, 6:09am UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/14 "2026-01-23T06:09:03Z")
The following proposal was drafted following discussions within the Chinese community.
Link to the Chinese/English versions of this proposal:
> **[PIP #22 Penpie DAT Adjustment Plan](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1K5bI3bXtK8Dy_svTBeeSB0nnYVLkn7HuLBoiDQHId5k/edit?usp=sharing)**
>
> PIP #22 Penpie DAT 調整計畫 一、 OSTR 代幣合併計畫 (Token Merger Plan) 1. 基礎數據 資產總量： vePENDLE 總量約為 12,759,676 顆 。 mPENDLE 總量為 12,759,676 顆 PNP 流通量為 1000 萬顆 。 國庫資產 : 260萬顆 mPendle 220萬顆 PNP 10萬顆 Pendle 170E 流動性 浮動之PNP數量 ~130ETH 其餘零散資產 轉換說明 : 每鑄造一枚...
In the event of any discrepancy between the English and Chinese versions, the Chinese version shall prevail.\*\*
PIP #22 Penpie DAT Adjustment Plan\*\*
I. OSTR Token Merger Plan
**1. Fundamental Data**
- Total Assets:
- Treasury Assets:
- Conversion Description:
**2. New Token Issuance**
- New Token Information :
- Treasury Adjustments:
- Token Allocation Model:
- Calculation Verification:
- Conversion Rules:
- Liquidity Migration:
**II. OSTR Tokenomics**
- Core Token:
- Staking Versions:
- Governance version:
**Revenue Distribution & mNAV Tax:**
- Distribution:
- Tax Mechanism:
- Remaining sPENDLE income (post-tax) will be used to buy back OSTR from the market and distributed to the OSTR pool. vlOSTR and sOSTR receive rewards with equal weight.
- Taxes collected must be used to buy back OSTR before the next cycle. If mNAV \> 1, assets can be used for market protection or directly locked into sPENDLE.
- Taxes belong to the Treasury, not the team.
- Taxes will not participate in OSTR staking dividends.
**III. OSTR Treasury Management & Team Fees**
- **Core Objective** : Ensure growth of protocol-controlled sPENDLE Vaults, buy back OSTR to increase market cap, and push up mNAV.
- Asset Usage:
- Team Operating Expenses:
**IV. Roadmap**
- **Planned Development:**
- **Timeline:**
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### Author:  [@PimmZ](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/PimmZ)
#### Post date: [January 23, 2026, 6:21am UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/15 "2026-01-23T06:21:37Z")
While I recognize the effort put into this financial engineering, we must address a critical moral question: What is the limit of a DAO’s power?
Governance is not Ownership: The purpose of governance is to manage protocol parameters, not to redefine property rights. A vote to repurpose or restructure a depositor’s principal is not “governance”—it is a breach of the fundamental social contract that DeFi is built upon.
The “Majority” Precedent: If we allow a majority vote to decide the fate of individual capital, we turn DAOs into a “Tyranny of the Majority.” This sets a dangerous precedent: it suggests that any protocol, when facing a crisis, can simply vote to seize or redistribute its users’ assets to save itself.
Stewardship vs. Control: A protocol is a steward, not an owner. Users entrusted their assets to a specific “liquid wrapper” service. If that service can no longer be provided, the moral obligation of the DAO is to facilitate a return of assets, not to use voting power to trap capital in a new, unrequested scheme.
Conclusion: The future of DeFi depends on the sanctity of the depositor’s principal. If we accept that governance can override ownership, we destroy the very “trustlessness” that makes this industry valuable. We must respect the boundary between protocol management and user property.
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### Author:  [@cy1202](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/cy1202)
#### Post date: [January 23, 2026, 6:22am UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/16 "2026-01-23T06:22:12Z")
sorry, 1 mpendle != 1 vependle, you got the lots of pnp tokens when you convert you pendle to mpendle during rush. It’s 1 mpendle+0.7837 PNP = 1vePENDLE。 And you agree you’ll never get back your PENDLE when you converted them, and you can exit mpendle in the market anytime with around 0.5-0.6 PENDLE in the past.
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### Author:  [@cy1202](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/cy1202)
#### Post date: [January 23, 2026, 6:29am UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/17 "2026-01-23T06:29:10Z")
1. The value of PENDLE was split at minting into the liquidity value of mPENDLE and the governance/yield value of PNP. Taking back 100% of the underlying assets means negating all of PNP’s past value contributions.
2. Most current mPENDLE holders are not the initial depositors, but rather purchased them at a discount of 0.5-0.6. A 1:1 payout would essentially drain PNP’s resources to reward speculators who came for arbitrage, allowing them to instantly gain 100% risk-free returns.
3. The underlying vePENDLE is essentially a ‘sunk asset,’ with no redemption right. mPENDLE is a perpetual yield certificate, not a deposit or debt.
4. Penpie is undergoing business restructuring, not bankruptcy liquidation. PNP represents the protocol’s governance rights and future cash flow expectations. Depriving PNP of its asset-backed rights not only eliminates the value of governance tokens but also means that no one will be motivated to build and govern this new protocol (OSTR) in the future.
5. According to the production function in the proposal, 1 complete PENDLE = 1 mPENDLE + 0.7837 PNP. If an mPENDLE user wants to take away that 1 PENDLE, are they willing to return the 0.7837 PNP first? Taking the benefits without returning the costs is not only unreasonable but also mathematically flawed.
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### Author:  [@super2delta](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/super2delta)
#### Post date: [January 23, 2026, 6:34am UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/18 "2026-01-23T06:34:31Z")
\*\*Support for PIP #22: Embracing Mathematical Rationality and Rejecting the Unreasonable Demand for 1:1 Redemption
\*\*
After carefully studying PIP #22, I **fully support** the current OSTR transition plan. In light of the fundamental changes to Pendle’s economic model, this is the only viable evolutionary path for Penpie.
Regarding the voices in the community calling for “1 mPENDLE to redeem 1 underlying PENDLE,” I believe this demand is untenable both logically and ethically. Here is why:
**1. Value Was Split Long Ago: You Cannot Have It Both Ways**
We must look at this through a historical lens. When users originally deposited 1 PENDLE into the protocol, they received not just mPENDLE, but also PNP incentives (or mining rewards).
According to the proposal’s quantitative calculation, **the value of 1 PENDLE actually = 1 mPENDLE + 0.7837 PNP.**
PNP represents governance rights and a portion of the yield rights, while mPENDLE represents the liquid wrapper. Demanding 100% of the underlying asset via mPENDLE now is tantamount to denying all the value PNP has generated in the past. Unless the redeemers are willing to return the PNP they originally mined, this constitutes **double-dipping** on the protocol’s assets.
**2. Secondary Market Costs and Fairness**
On-chain data is not only public but also brutally honest. mPENDLE has long traded at 0.5-0.6 PENDLE in the secondary market. This means a significant number of current mPENDLE holders are not initial depositors, but **arbitrageurs who bought in at a 40-50% discount.**
They enjoyed a liquidity discount at entry, yet now demand redemption at par (1 PENDLE)? If the protocol were to fill this massive gap, it would essentially be **siphoning the equity of PNP holders (Treasury assets) to subsidize secondary market speculation.** This is not only unfair but a betrayal of the protocol’s long-term supporters (PNP Holders).
**3. The Irreversible Nature of Protocol Assets**
The asset held by Penpie is vePENDLE, which is a **locked asset**. The core rule of veTokens is sacrificing liquidity in exchange for yield. From its inception, mPENDLE was designed as a **“Perpetual Yield Certificate,”** not a “demand deposit.” Demanding a 1:1 rigid redemption violates the underlying physical attribute of vePENDLE (which cannot be unlocked) and ignores the contractual spirit of the protocol.
**Conclusion:**
The current proposal offers a conversion value of approximately **0.604 PENDLE** for mPENDLE, which is already higher than its secondary market price. This represents the utmost good faith from the protocol. I strongly urge the community to remain rational and support PIP #22. Let us allow both PNP and mPENDLE holders to achieve a win-win situation under the new OSTR structure, rather than getting trapped in a meaningless zero-sum game.
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### Author:  [@cy1202](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/cy1202)
#### Post date: [January 23, 2026, 6:34am UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/19 "2026-01-23T06:34:47Z")
The mpendle user doesn’t simply receive 50% of the allocation.
They actually receive an additional 7% allocation + Treasury liquidity + governance rights.
You can’t ignore the value of this. The Treasury’s existing liquidity is worth over 300 eth.
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### Author:  [@cy1202](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/cy1202)
#### Post date: [January 23, 2026, 6:42am UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/20 "2026-01-23T06:42:14Z")
pretty fair for pnp and mpendle holder, go ahead.
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### Author:  [@vpmelody](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/u/vpmelody)
#### Post date: [January 23, 2026, 6:52am UTC](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756/21 "2026-01-23T06:52:30Z")
I want to share a different perspective on this. Based on the proposal in post #14 (PIP #22), Penpie is not closing down; it is moving forward with a strategic evolution as ‘Onchain Strategy’.
The key point is that our vePENDLE is still a highly productive asset that generates ongoing income. Just like any active company or DAO, the goal is to keep our core assets working to create value for the long term. Since the protocol is continuing to operate, there is no reason to redeem or break up these holdings.
Furthermore, we need a solution that maximizes value for **both mPendle and PNP holders** , not just one side. Under PIP #22, it maintains the market value for everyone as it was before the recent vePENDLE announcement. This approach is the best way to protect the interests of all participants.
By moving forward with the OSTR model, it is preserving the productivity of our treasury while building a more sustainable future for the community. I believe we should focus on this path for growth and the revenue it will continue to bring in, rather than treating the project as if it is ending.
[Next page](https://gov.magpiexyz.io/t/evaluating-strategic-paths-forward/756.md?page=2)